Women's Political Participation in the Aftermath of Civil War: Evidence from Peru[*]

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Abstract

How does civil war violence affect female political participation? Using rich micro-level data, I investigate the legacies of Peru's Shining Path insurgency on women's engagement in local politics. Based on an original data set of candidates running for local councilors, and a difference-in-differences research design, I show that electoral gender quotas have been more successful in municipalities exposed to the insurgency than in those that remained unaffected, other things equal. However, while larger effects are observed in areas that were controlled by the insurgents, the positive effects of violence on female political participation are reversed in areas affected by sexual violence (mostly perpetrated by state forces), which underscores how different types of violence exert starkly divergent effects. These findings are not explained by *structural* changes induced by the conflict (e.g., changes in sex ratios). Instead, the evidence points to *behavioral* adjustments (coping strategies) linked to wartime experiences. Finally, I provide evidence that these effects persist across generations.

1 Introduction

Women experience war differently than men. Throughout history, insurgents and soldiers in the front line have overwhelmingly been male.[1] Notwithstanding numerous and notable exceptions to this rule,[2] it continues to be true that men die disproportionately more frequently than women in direct armed conflicts.[3] Women, in turn, are confronted with multiple faces of war. While a minority is recruited as fighters or in support roles by either side in the conflict, some become targets specifically because they are women,[4] others become refugees or itinerant migrants,[5] and many others have to "take over" and adopt social and political roles that are traditionally fulfilled by males in their communities. For instance, women may enter the labor force or increase their participation as community organizers and political activists to cope with the adverse consequences of war and its aftermath (Buvinic et al., 2013).

Despite both the gender dimension and the transformative power of wartime experiences, our understanding of how—and to what extent—violent conflict affects women and men differently remains limited. At the micro level, wartime violence has been found to affect a myriad of individual outcomes, ranging from political engagement (Bellows and Miguel, 2009; Blattman, 2009), social cohesion (Gilligan, Pasquale, and Samii, 2014; Voors et al., 2012), and reintegration success (Annan et al., 2011; Humphreys and Weinstein, 2007) to human capital accumulation (Blattman and Annan, 2010; Chamarbagwala and Morán, 2011; Ichino and Winter-Ebmer, 2004; Leon, 2012; Shemyakina, 2011; Swee, 2009), health-related outcomes (Alderman, Hoddinott, and

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[1]Rough estimates of exceptions to this rule amount to less than one percent of all warriors in history, and less than five percent in the present interstate system (Goldstein, 2003, p. 10)

[2]Historic cases of female-led rebellions include, among several others: the resistance of the women of Haarlem, organized by Kenau Hasselaer in the Netherlands against the besieging of Spaniards from 1572–1573; Queen Boudica's uprising against the Roman conquest of southern Britain in AD 60 or 61; and Trieu Thi Trinh's rebellion in Vietnam, which successfully resisted the Chinese in 248 (Cook, 2006). Similarly, women made up a substantial fraction of regular combatants in the Kingdom of Dahomey (present-day Benin), where female palace guards became professional warriors during the 18th and 19th centuries (Alpern, 1998). More recently, women's engagement as fighters in civil wars has been notorious in Sierra Leone, Liberia, Sri Lanka, and Peru (Coulter, 2008).

[3]Based on survey data from 13 countries, Obermeyer et al. (2008) estimate that males accounted for 81 percent of violent war deaths from 1955–2002. Ormhaug, Meier, and Hernes (2009) disaggregate existing data collections on conflict-related deaths by gender, and conclude that "men are more likely to die during conflicts, whereas women die more often of indirect causes after the conflict is over" (p. 3).

[4]Gender-based violence, including the systematic rape of women, has often been used as a weapon of war. See recent work by Cohen (2013a,b) and Wood (2006, 2009).

[5]The World Bank (2011) estimates that 80 percent of refugees and those displaced by violent conflict are women and children.

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Kinsey, 2006; Bundervoet, Verwimp, and Akresh, 2009), and marriage market dynamics (She-myakina, 2009). Nonetheless, little empirical research has explicitly looked into how war (and postwar) experiences vary by gender and how these experiences influence behavior along gender lines.[6]

A growing body of evidence suggests that wars reshape the social structure in gender-specific ways, creating new opportunities for women in politics. For example, a number of historical and sociological studies link the enfranchisement of women in Britain to social and cultural changes induced by World War I (Grayzel, 1999; Ramirez, Soysal, and Shanahan, 1997). Similarly, recent case studies and policy reports provide qualitative evidence that countries tend to see an expansion of women's political roles during wartime. It appears that women engage more actively in public life through their participation in organizations such as schools, hospitals, and local political institutions (Buvinic et al., 2013; Kumar, 2001; Justino et al., 2012; Schindler, 2010, 2011; Sørensen, 1998).[7] There is also cross-country quantitative evidence that seems to corroborate this trend.[8] However, there is mixed evidence on whether women's empowerment in politics continues in the aftermath of war (Justino et al., 2012; O'Connell, 2011; Sørensen, 1998).[9]

To the best of my knowledge, the question on whether violent conflict affects political behavior in gender-specific ways has not been quantitatively analyzed—a concern that has been echoed in recent reviews of the literature on the legacies of civil war (Buvinic et al., 2013; Justino et al., 2012). The paucity of work in this area has serious implications for the design and implementation of post-conflict policies. If wartime experiences activate female political engagement, there is a

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[6]Some exceptions include studies in applied microeconomics documenting that the U.S. experienced a sharp increase in female labor participation during and after World War II (Acemoglu, Lyle et al., 2004; Fernández, Fogli, and Olivetti, 2004; Goldin, 1991).

[7]According to Kumar (2001), this was true of the role of women in Bosnia and Herzegovina, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Rwanda, among other cases. Furthermore, women may also play crucial roles in mobilizing civilians for political ends or in raising awareness about gender issues. For example, in Sudan and Kosovo female-led organizations mobilized women to participate in elections and local consultations (Justino et al., 2012).

[8]Hughes (2009) finds that certain types of civil conflict during the 1980s and 1990s positively affected the proportion of seats taken by women in national parliaments in low-income nations.

[9]It is unclear whether female-led organizations created during the conflict remain active in the long-term. In some cases, women are excluded from peacemaking negotiations (O'Connell, 2011; Sørensen, 1998; Rehn and Sirleaf, 2002) and newly formed governments (Geisler, 1995; Waylen, 1994). But in others, female-led organizations continue playing a vital role in the post-conflict recovery phase. For instance, in Haiti, Liberia, Nicaragua, and Sierra Leone, female staffing and gender-specific service in the police forces were introduced by transitional governments (World Bank, 2011).

high opportunity cost of not providing an institutional channel for a sustained participation of women in politics after war. In other words, the post-conflict recovery phase may offer a unique opportunity toward rectifying female exclusion from political power. Therefore, understanding the gender consequences of war is critical to better inform policy-making in the post-conflict era.

This paper seeks to fill this gap in the literature by studying the legacy of the Shining Path conflict in Peru. Using rich micro-level data on civil war violence and women's participation in local politics, I present evidence that new opportunities for women as political actors may arise during wartime, persist in the postwar period, and be transmitted across generations. As will be described later, this study is in a unique position to adjudicate between *structural* and *behavioral* explanations of female political participation in post-conflict settings. I believe this is the first micro-level empirical work on the the relationship between violent conflict and women's engagement in politics.

Peru offers the ideal context for studying how a legacy of violent conflict affects female political participation. From 1980 to the mid-1990s, the country experienced a brutal episode of violence. The Shining Path insurgency reached one-third of Peruvian municipalities, exposing civilians to different types of violent events perpetrated by both the insurgents and the state security forces. At the end of the conflict, for reasons unrelated to the insurrection, electoral gender quotas were adopted in municipal elections. This policy shock generated varying levels of female political participation across the country, challenging traditional views of women's place in society. Hence, by focusing on the case of Peru, I am able to exploit rich variation in types of violence and women's engagement in local politics across time and space.

Based on an original data set of candidates competing in municipal elections, I show that the implementation of electoral gender quotas for local councilors—unanticipatedly adopted at end of the conflict—has been more successful in Peruvian municipalities exposed to the Shining Path insurgency than in those that remained unaffected, other things equal. I employ a difference-in-differences design with fixed effects to test whether the proportion of female candidates in local (municipal) elections changed differentially in municipalities affected by civil war violence (treatment group) versus municipalities that remained unaffected (control group), before and after the implementation of the electoral gender quotas. I find that the proportion of female candidates contesting municipal elections increased differentially in municipalities exposed to the insurrection. On average, a municipality affected by the insurrection has one more female candidate

running for local councilor. These findings are robust to a number of statistical tests specifically designed to rule out alternative explanations. I further examine the heterogeneous effects of different types of violence. While larger effects are observed in areas with a higher proportion of violent events perpetrated by the insurgents, the positive effects of violence on women's political engagement are reversed in areas affected by sexual violence—mostly perpetrated by state security forces—, which underscores how different types of violence exert starkly different effects.

The increase in female political participation observed in conflict-affected areas does not seem to be driven by *structural* changes induced by the conflict (e.g., changes in the sex ratio or household composition). Instead, the evidence points to *behavioral* adjustments (coping strategies) linked to wartime experiences. Along these lines, I examine the intergenerational transmission of women's political roles. Based on different pieces of survey data, I provide causal evidence that women exposed to the conflict during their childhood exhibit higher levels of civic and political engagement than their counterparts—i.e., those who were born in the same municipality but in a different year, and those who were born in a different municipality but belong to the same cohort. Most importantly, similar effects are not observed among males.

This study speaks to important debates on the legacies of civil war and the unequal representation of women and men in politics. There are three strands of literature to which this paper makes a contribution. First, there is a rapidly expanding amount of micro-empirical research on the effects of violent conflict on civic and political engagement. This research has surprisingly ignored that the effects they document may vary by gender. Using experimental or quasi-experimental approaches, these studies have found that individuals exposed to wartime violence exhibit higher levels of civic and political engagement after the conflict. For example, Bellows and Miguel (2009) found that conflict-related displacement and deaths in Sierra Leone led to greater political participation and political awareness.[10] Similarly, Blattman (2009) presents evidence for a connection linking past violence in Northern Uganda to increased engagement in politics among (arguably) randomly abducted ex-combatants.[11]

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[10]Specifically, households that directly experienced more intense war violence are robustly more likely to attend community meetings, more likely to join local political and community groups, and more likely to vote (Bellows and Miguel, 2009).

[11]Based on survey data, Blattman finds that "forced recruitment leads to greater postwar political participation—a 27% increase in the likelihood of voting and a doubling of the likelihood of being a community leader among former abductees" (Blattman, 2009, p. 231).

The two studies mentioned above measure exposure to violence at the individual level,[12] but similar effects of wartime violence have been observed using indirect or community-level measures of conflict victimization. For example, based on results from behavioral games and survey data, Gilligan, Pasquale, and Samii (2014) found that members of communities affected by the unpredictable path of violence during Nepal's civil war exhibited greater levels of pro-social motivation, measured by altruistic giving and public good contributions.[13] Furthermore, the *benign* effects[14] of exposure to violence on political participation have not only been found in post-civil war contexts. A recent study by Bateson (2012) documents the existence of a strong link between crime victimization and political participation and engagement.[15]

While the aforementioned works present solid empirical results, they fail to provide a convincing explanation as to why a crime victim, a war survivor, or an abducted ex-combatant may decide to participate more actively in civic or political life. As Blattman and Miguel (2010) argue in a recent review of the civil war literature in economics, "[t]he social and institutional legacies of conflict are arguably the most important but least understood of all war impacts" (p. 42). This paper contributes to a better understanding of the mechanisms through which wartime violence may affect political engagement by looking at the relationship between these variables along gender lines, and by examining how different types of violence may exert divergent effects.

This paper also contributes to a broad literature on on the relationship between gender and political participation. Following the seminal work by Duverger (1955) that documented women's underrepresentation in politics during the 1950s, scholarly work in this field has been

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[12]In one case, exposure to violence captures individuals whose households directly experienced war violence Bellows and Miguel (2009), while in the other it measures direct experience in combat Blattman (2009).

[13]These results are consistent with Voors et al. (2012), who find robust statistical evidence that community-level exposure to wartime violence has increased rates of voting, community leadership, and civic engagement in Burundi.

[14]A more nuanced explanation of the effects of violent conflict on political attitudes and behavior is presented in recent empirical studies that try to isolate the effects of specific types of violence. For example, García-Ponce and Wantchekon (2015) find a persistent legacy of colonial repression in Madagascar where individuals living in districts affected by extremely violent colonial-era repression exhibit significantly lower perceptions of freedom of expression in society today. In a forthcoming paper, Grossman, Manekin, and Miodownik (2015) look at the effects of exposure to violence on political attitudes and behavior by distinguishing between attitudes and behavior towards in-group and out-group members. The authors find that exposure to combat among Israeli ex-combatants hardens attitudes towards the rival and reduces support for negotiation and compromise.

[15]Based on survey data from five continents the Bateson (2012) shows that individuals who report recent crime victimization not only participate in politics more than comparable nonvictims, but also express greater support for vigilantism and harsh policing tactics.

mostly concerned with understanding the causes of, as well as the potential solutions to, the political gender gap.[16] Explanations of the political gender gap have emphasized the role of institutional choices such as the type of electoral system (Kenworthy and Malami, 1999; Norris, 1985; Paxton, Hughes, and Green, 2006; Reynolds, 1999; Rule, 1981, 1987), as well as individual characteristics and contextual factors (e.g., labor market conditions or economic growth) (Iversen and Rosenbluth, 2006).[17] However, this research has often ignored that some of most abrupt changes in gender equality may be connected to transformations that occur at critical points in history such as episodes of war or large-scale social movements.[18]

Recent work has highlighted the role of gender quotas as a response to the enduring underrepresentation of women. Over the past two decades, around 100 countries have adopted a gender quota legislation or implemented party rules requiring a minimum percentage of candidates (or legislators to be women). Some scholars argue that the adoption of quotas is a 'fast track' alternative to the slow expansion of women's political representation (Dahlerup and Freidenvall, 2005). Nevertheless, why quotas are more effective in some contexts than in others remains unclear (Dahlerup, 2013). Scholarly work addressing this question often focuses on technical aspects of the quota legislation, such as the placement of the candidates in the list (Jones, 2004), or the sanctions for noncompliance (Dahlerup, 2013), but ignores that the exact same quota law may have different effects depending on the context in which it is implemented (Jones, 2005; Schmidt and Saunders, 2004). Despite the fact that gender quotas are often in the menu of post-conflict policies, there is no systematic evidence on the effectiveness of such policies. This paper contributes

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[16]Although the global picture is still pessimistic, there has been a remarkable progress in women's representation in the industrialized world—e.g., in the Scandinavian region, women represent 42 percent of the total number of parliamentarians (Rosenbluth, Kalla, and Teele, 2015). Even within the developing world, we observe significant improvements: women's parliamentary representation in Africa has increased more than tenfold since 1960 (Hughes, 2009), and in Latin America the proportion of female cabinet ministers increased from 7 percent in 1990 to 18 percent by the mid-2000s (Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson, 2005).

[17]It is important to note that, while there is substantial work on gender differences in political participation in the U.S. and Western Europe, the analysis of the determinants of the political gender gap in the developing world has received little attention. As stated in a recent article by Morgan and Buice (2013): "[...] fewer attempts have been made to understand the factors that facilitate or undermine public support for women in politics, particularly outside the developed world." (p. 644).

[18]Consider, for instance, the case of Rwanda, which stands out in particular with women at 64 percent of the Chamber of Deputies—the world's highest percentage of parliamentary representation. Rwanda is a case in which women's representation in politics is triggered as a result of a civil war (Hogg, 2009). Similarly, Ingiriis and Hoehne (2013) argue that the most substantial empowerment of Somali women in the political sphere was triggered by the civil war.

to the literature by evaluating the effectiveness of gender quotas in a post-conflict setting.

Finally, this study also relates to the literature on gender impacts of violent conflict. Although still scarce, recent micro-level research has examined the gender impacts of violent conflict on reintegration (Annan et al., 2011), educational attainment (Chamarbagwala and Morán, 2011; Leon, 2012; Swee, 2009), and health outcomes (Alderman, Hoddinott, and Kinsey, 2006; Bundervoet, Verwimp, and Akresh, 2009; Grimard and Laszlo, 2010). These studies provide mixed empirical evidence. For instance, Annan et al. (2011) show that women returning from armed groups in Uganda reintegrate socially and are resilient. Likewise, Grimard and Laszlo (2010) look at the impact of the Shining Path insurrection on women's height and anemia, and find support for the existence of resilience in communities affected by the conflict. On the other hand, Chamarbagwala and Morán (2011) and Leon (2012) find larger negative impacts of exposure to violence on women's educational attainment in Guatemala and Peru, respectively.[19]

As emphasized in recent reviews of the literature on violent conflict and gender inequality, previous work has predominantly focused on sexual and gender-based violence. A wider set of outcomes must be considered to better understand the consequences of war (Buvinic et al., 2013, p. 2). Moreover, as Justino et al. (2012, p. 17) note, "rigorous empirical evidence on the impact of conflict on civic and political engagement is extremely limited and, within it, gender-differentiated analyses are practically nonexistent." Some scholars have advanced explanations about potential mechanisms underlying the relationship between violent conflict and female political representation (Hughes, 2009), or about changes in gender roles more generally (Wood, 2008), but none of these has been econometrically analyzed, neither at the macro- nor at the micro-level. Therefore, this study is a novel addition to the literature on conflict and gender.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 provides historical background and institutional context about the Shining Path insurgency, the role of women during wartime, and the adoption of electoral gender quotas in the aftermath; section 3 outlines the conceptual framework and discusses the mechanisms to be tested; sections 4 describes the data sources; section 5 explains the empirical strategy; section 6 presents the main results, heterogenous effects, and robustness checks; section 7 assesses potential mechanisms; and section 8 concludes.

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[19]However, the extent to which male population is affected may be conditioned by the existence of military draft. Swee (2009) provides empirical evidence that the military draft was a primary mechanism through which the Bosnian civil war affected school attainment of male population, with much weaker effects observed in females.

2 Historical Background and Institutional Context

2.1 The Shining Path Insurgency

The Communist Party of Peru (PCP, by its Spanish acronym), also known as *Sendero Luminoso* (Shining Path)[20], emerged in the mid-1960s as a local political movement in the department of Ayacucho, one of the poorest and most inaccessible regions of the country. The movement was led by Abimael Guzmán Reynoso—known by the *nom de guerre* President Gonzalo—, a communist professor of philosophy at the regional university (the Universidad Nacional San Cristóbal de Huamanga).[21] In its inception, the Shining Path was organized in the style of Mao's Red March. The movement advocated the adoption of rural insurgency strategies in order to disarticulate "market-oriented" agricultural production. This was the first stage towards generating political change that would conclude in a Communist Revolution.[22] The capture of Lima, the capital city, was envisioned as the final stage of the armed rebellion.

During the 1970s, Shining Path was able to establish an extensive network of militants and supporters in the rural areas of southern Peru—particularly in the departments of Ayacucho and Apurímac. The consolidation of this network of supporters was made possible through the infiltration of local universities by Maoist activists.[23] Eventually, Shining Path would complement this strategy with the creation of the so-called "popular schools," which were established in relatively inaccessible rural areas.[24] This was a crucial step in the development of the organization, since it provided the Maoist movement with an effective mechanism of recruitment and diffusion of its "revolutionary" message. Forced recruitment was rare in the beginnings of the organization. Ac-

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[20]Throughout this study, I use the terms Sendero and Shining Path interchangeably to refer to the Maoist insurgent group from the Communist Party of Peru.

[21]The University of Huamanga continues operating to date. During the summer 2012, I conducted exploratory fieldwork in Ayacucho and visited the university. The general impression is that, even until today, almost 20 years after the end of the conflict, the university carries the stigma of becoming breeding ground for rebel groups and communist organizations.

[22]Theoretically, "[this strategy] would eventually cut off the supply of basic food commodities to cities, increase urban social disorder, and allow the Shining Path to encircle the principal urban areas, culminating in the downfall of the Peruvian state" (Kent, 1993, p. 442).

[23]According to Degregori (1990), Shining Path exerted substantial control over both faculty and curriculum at the University of Huamanga during this period.

[24]Several provinces in northern Ayacucho and the province of Andahuaylas in Apuriímac formed the principal territorial focus of these activities. See Kent (1993) for a detailed description of the geographical dimensions of the Shining Path insurgency.

cording to Weinstein (2006), since short-term gains of participating in the Peruvian civil war were unlikely, large numbers of poor peasant in the Andean region were recruited through strategies that emphasized ideological appeals.[25]

Shining Path made its first attacks in the early 1980s.[26] On May 1980, a few days before the national election, militants of the PCP seized some municipios of the department of Ayacucho, calling citizens to boycott the electoral process, and publicly burning the ballots. This incident was regarded as a symbolic declaration of war against the Peruvian state. The response from the government was delayed and ineffective (Palmer, 1992). The army started operations against the Shining Path almost two years after the first attack, and military forces were accused of using disproportionate violence against both rebels and civilians, which fueled the geographical expansion of the rebellion over the following years.

The first base of the insurrection was the Southern Sierra region, but the rebels immediately reached the Peruvian jungle, and spread to several other parts of the country, including the coastal cities.[27] By 1992, the civil war had practically expanded to one-third of Peruvian municipalities, covering 75 percent of the total number of Provinces in Peru. The highest point of violence was reached in the mid-1980s and early 1990s, right before the capture of Abimael Guzmán, the head of the insurrection. The map in Figure 1 shows the geographic expansion of the conflict, indicating Shining Path violent activity at the municipality level for any given time period.[28]

In September 1992, Shining Path's leader Abimael Guzmán was captured. This marked the beginning of a new period characterized by a decline in the intensity of political violence, and

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[25]Following Weinstein (2006), the Shining Path attracted only the most committed investors, i.e. high-commitment individuals willing to make costly investments in exchange for future rewards. The insurgency was organized around ideology, used violence strategically, and harshly punished errors.

[26]While I do not refer to the Shining Path as a terrorist organization in this article, according to the Geneva Conventions and Security Council Resolution 1566 (2004), Shining Path is considered a terrorist group because it engaged in acts of violence that "intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants with the purpose of intimidating a population or compelling a government or an international organization to do or abstain from doing any act."

[27]The cycle of political violence worsened in the late 1980s with the creation of a new armed organization, the Revolutionary Movement Tupac Amaru (MRTA, by its Spanish acronym). MRTA actions were violent, but they were much less lethal than those of the Shining Path, accounting for about only two percent of the total number of killings and forced disappearances during the entire civil war period, based on data from the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.

[28]In this map, violent activity includes any type of violence as recorded by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, such as killings, disappearances, abductions, sexual violence, and torture.

a transition to reconstruction and development. By 1995, political violence had ceased in most regions. In June 2001, a Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission (now on, TRC) was established to document abuses committed during the civil war. Based on testimonies , from June 2001 to August 2003, the TRC reconstructed 36,019 violent events that took place from 1980–2000. Figure 2 presents the time series of different types of violence that took place during the conflict.[29]

It is important to emphasize that, over almost two decades, the Shining Path insurrection created substantial variation in both the type and the level of violence across the Peruvian territory. Figure 3 shows the spatial distribution of different types of violence displaying aggregate measures of conflict intensity (number of events). According to the TRC data, around 30 percent of Peruvian municipalities were affected by Shining Path violence. It is estimated that the Shining Path perpetrated about 40 percent of all war crimes, while the rest are attributed to state security forces. The map in Figure 4 shows the geographic distribution of the proportion to deaths attributed to the Shining Path.

2.2 Women and Wartime Violence

Civilians may contend with wartime violence in different ways. While a minority may react indifferently, many try to avoid it—e.g., withdrawing from public life, or migrating to safer areas, others respond with more violence—e.g., through their incorporation into either rebel groups, state security forces, or paramilitary groups—, and some others adopt strategies of civil, non-violent resistance—e.g., engaging in politics, becoming activist, organizing mass protests and peaceful demonstrations. How did women cope with wartime violence in Peru? Based on historical accounts, at least three different stories could be told about the role of women in the Peruvian civil war (Coral, 1998; Degregori, 1996; Jaquette and Wolchik, 1998; Palmer, 1992; Rousseau, 2012; Stern, 1998). First, there are the women recruited by the Shining Path. Then there are the women who protested against either state-led or Shining Path-related violence. And there are the women

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[29]Two main peaks of violence are observed in the data. From 1980–1982, the number of violent events ranged between 100 and 800. The conflict intensified over the next few years, reaching a peak in 1984 (almost 6,000 acts of violence). This was followed by relatively peaceful period from 1985 to 1987, but in 1988 violence intensified abruptly again, reaching a second highest point in 1989–1990, which lasted until 1993. After that, violence dropped sharply and continued fading. Leftovers of Sendero remain scattered throughout the country, but they are not perceived anymore as a national security threat.

who were targets of violence.

2.2.1 Women in the Shining Path

Shining Path aimed at recruiting members from university departments with large numbers of students. The largest departments were social sciences, education, agronomy, and medicine. With the exception of agronomy, the composition of these departments were in majority female, and hence women made up a significant portion of Shining Path's membership. Female participation was one of the most striking features of the movement,[30] and according to some estimates, women made up approximately one-third of Shining Path's membership (Starn, 1995).

Nevertheless, historians seem to agree that a gender agenda was not part of Shining Path's platform. Gender issues were merely used as propaganda. In other words, Sendero recognized the need for women in the movement, but it did not offer them political power. The relationship that the party established with its female members was predominantly instrumental. On one hand, Sendero made efforts to recruit women to fulfill logistical tasks (excluding them from leadership positions).[31] On the other hand, the presence of women in the movement derived from their own aspiration to enter new spaces of participation, rather than from an ideological affinity (Coral, 1998).

In sum, many women in search of new spaces of participation joined Sendero, and even though these women achieved an important presence, Shining Path was not capable of incorporating their gender interests in a programatic manner. Instead, the organization relied on a leadership style— around the figure of Abimael Guzmán—that reproduced and reinforced traditional patriarchal relations. Women in the Shining Path "found themselves inserted into insurgent versions of patriarchal subordination" (Stern, 1998, p. 342).

2.2.2 Women Against Violence

During the 1970s, Shining Path build a network with rural communities and the urban poor through its relationship with teachers, who had been recruited and indoctrinated at local uni-

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[30]See *The New York Times*, September 22, 1992 for a brief discussion (written in the midst of the conflict) on the role of women in the Shining Path.

[31]Although there is anecdotal evidence that some women participated as combatants (Castro, 1994), the mythical image of Sendero's women as ruthless fighters in charge of administering the coup de grace (a final gunshot in the back of the head) has been discredited by recent studies (Stern, 1998).

versities.[32] Shining Path created "popular schools", in which both male and female adolescents received indoctrination and military training. In the communities in which Shining Path was able to develop an important influence, adult women were indirectly involved through their children. For example, they were asked to provide Sendero members and commandants with food and housing in a periodic basis. According to Coral (1998), "already in this stage women experienced a certain discontent because of the burdens this relationship placed in their precarious household economies." (p. 354).

Shining Path's disproportionate use of violence against civilians and local police forces nurtured the popular discontent. Additionally, in 1983, the state security forces unleashed an intense year-long "dirty war." In face of indiscriminate repression, popular discontent increased even more. Shining Path reacted by diversifying its repertoire of violent methods, including the use of extortion and forced recruitment. Within this context, a majority of the civilian population found itself trapped between the military's offensive and Sendero's indiscriminate use of violence.

As violence intensified, three main coping strategies were employed by the population: migration to safer areas, armed self-defense, and civil resistance. Thus, three key actors emerged during the conflict: refugees, self-defense groups (the so-called *rondas campesinas*), and civil resistance groups. For the most part, civil resistance groups were composed of women, who played key roles in mobilizing and organizing the civil society to protest against violence and denounce human rights violations.

Wartime threatened the family space and reordered the role of women, often separating men from their families, leaving women to organize themselves to raise their children and defend their communities.[33] This necessity for taking initiative encouraged women to mobilize the civil society to protest against violence—including a nation-wide march for peace in 1988. Historians coincide that the conflict empowered Peruvian women and brought them into the public sphere. For instance, in the midst of the Shining Path insurgency the historian Daniel Castro (1994) wrote:

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[32]Since teachers are commonly regarded as community leaders, particularly in rural areas of the country, Shining Path saw them as ideal agents to reach the population and diffuse the movement's ideology.

[33]According to Coral (1998), one of the first actions undertaken by women was the to organize their family's dispersal. Women would hide their husband and the adolescent children at greatest risk in zones of refuge. They would leave family elders at home in order not to lose her family's stake in the community and carry their smallest children with them. They would also coordinate economic and family activities. Anecdotal evidence suggest that this process of dispersal and subsequent coordination was repeated as safety conditions changed in the zones of refuge, and that some families experienced up to four successive displacements during the war.

"[...] the war in Peru has radically transformed women's perceptions of themselves and their role in society, and, regardless of the outcome, the future does not augur well for the survival of the traditional patterns of gender oppression." (p. 223). Similarly, Stern argues that "[t]he insurgency created new and visible spaces for some and female youth to assume roles and responsibilities at odds with conventional social restrictions [...] Women's new prominence as citizen-subjects, with their own political organizations and agendas, has left an important and probably inerasable legacy" (Stern, 1998, pp. 342–343). Furthermore, Stern emphasizes that "women's 'awakening' as more visible and empowered citizen-subjects developed largely outside of, and often in opposition to, Sendero Luminoso" (Stern, 1998, p. 342).

A number of female-led organizations emerged during the conflict, many of which still operate today, such as the *clubes de madres* (mothers' clubs). These grassroots civic organizations addressed practical issues such as war-induced economic needs, displacement, and human rights violations, among several others.[34] This was a major change since political activity, and public life more generally, were previously inaccessible to poor women.[35]

Over time, many of these female-led organizations became stable and influential organizations, in particular the mothers' clubs, which facilitated negotiation for resources and jobs.[36] Within this context, women increased their engagement in communal endeavors and gained

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[34]For example, women became leaders of migrant associations, relatives-of-the-disappeared organizations, and committees for the provision of food (e.g., the *cocinas populares* (community kitchens) and the *vasos de leche* (a daily glass-of-milk program). The first women's organizations were semi-clandestine groups created to provide moral support and share information about victims. Absences of men massive, whether permanent absences as a result of death or disappearance, or temporary absences as a result of migration for security or economic reasons.

[35]Interestingly, women's contact with political parties was low, as "parties focused their activities on organized associations of workers, students, professionals, marginal urban residents, and peasants that were dominated by men" (Coral, 1998, p. 348). While female participation in political organizations had increased significantly during the 1970s, this increase had mostly been driven by the incorporation of middle-class women (Coral, 1998; Rousseau, 2012).

[36]To put this in perspective, consider the case of Ayacucho. By the end of the 1970s, there were only 60 mothers' clubs in the department. During the conflict years these organizations multiplied across the provinces in the department. A province-level Federation of Mothers' Clubs (Federación Provincial de Clubes de Madres de Huamanga) was founded in 1988, and a Departmental Congress of Mothers' Clubs was first created in November 1991. By 1995, the Departmental Federation of Mothers' Clubs of Ayacucho (FEDECMA, by its Spanish Acronym) had come to include 1,400 mothers' clubs and approximately 80,000 affiliated women. FEDECMA organized around two key concerns: the defense of human rights and the struggle for economic survival. It organized an extensive network of female leaders, which enabled access to programs and resources from NGOs such as food, health, and education. It also served as a space for sharing experiences and designing strategies towards defending human rights (Coral, 1998, pp. 358–359).

leadership positions. This trend in women's empowerment as political actors appears to have continued after the conflict. In words of Stern, '[w]hat is clear [...] is that the crises of war have impelled and enabled women to establish themselves as insistent citizen-subjects in the shaping of a post-war polity" (Stern, 1998, p. 344).

2.2.3 Violence Against Women

During the 1983–1984 "dirty war," targets of violence were mostly men. However, since women were the most stable population group in the community, they ended up becoming targets as well. While the use of gender-based violence was not a widespread strategy of war during the conflict, there is evidence that sexual violence against women traumatized the population in specific regions of the country. For example, Theidon (2004) documents that the political violence that took place from 1980 to 1992 negatively affects a second generation of women in these areas, including sufferings connected to memories and physical affliction. Based on the analysis of individual testimonies reported to the Peruvian TRC, Leiby (2009) finds that rape was overwhelmingly the most frequent form of abuse, comprising about 48 percent of all cases of sexual violence.

As in many other civil wars, sexual violence in Peru served as a state's weapon to defeat the insurgents. In contrast to other cases, such as the conflict in Guatemala, in Peru sexual violence was more selective: a deliberate and targeted a tool for punishing rebels and potential recruits.[37] Most abuses were perpetrated by agents of the state.[38] While Shining Path was responsible for more than half of the conflict-related deaths and disappearances, the Maoist insurgents were responsible for only 11 percent of the reported cases of sexual violence. About 85 percent of the reported rapes were attributed to state security forces. According to Wood (2006), the reason why Sendero rarely engaged in sexual violence may be due to the fact that females comprised a high fraction of combatants or supporters.[39]

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[37]The state did not engage in massive rape of villages, but rather targeted specific individuals. About 71 percent of sexual violations involved a single victim (Leiby, 2009, p. 463).

[38]In fact, 55 percent of sexual violence acts occurred in state-controlled facilities, such as prisons and regional military bases (Leiby, 2009, p. 456).

[39]Wood (2006) argues that "An army for whom females comprise a high fraction of combatants may be particularly constrained in its use of sexual violence. This is suggested by the empirical pattern that female-intensive insurgencies in El Salvador, Sri Lanka, Peru, and Colombia appear to carry out less sexual violence. However, the mechanism is not clear, and these insurgencies share other characteristics as well, such as an unusual degree of internal discipline."

2.3 Electoral Gender Quotas in the Aftermath of Civil War

In Peru, as in the rest of Latin America, women have historically been excluded from political power and participation in democracy. Suffrage was granted for women in 1955, but it was not until 1979 that suffrage was extended for the illiterate population. In October 1997, once major armed conflict had ceased, Peru adopted electoral gender quotas for both national and local elections. The quota law stipulated that at least 25 percent of the candidates competing for a seat in the national congress or in a municipal council should be either males or females (Ley Orgánica de Elecciones 26859; Ley de Elecciones Municipales 26864).[40]

The adoption of gender quotas was not a byproduct of the civil war. The quota law was an abrupt policy change, introduced for political reasons unrelated to the conflict. It was neither an explicit demand from civil society organizations protesting against violence nor an issue raised by Shining Path's supporters. While gender equality had initially been a rhetorical commitment of the Sendero's ideology, debates and negotiations on policies to advance gender political equality in Peru remained beyond the province of the conflict. In fact, it remains unclear why, after several unsuccessful attempts to establish electoral gender quotas, president Fujimori finally intervened to send a quota bill to congress (Schmidt, 2003).[41] The 1997 quota law was then an unexpected policy change.

The electoral gender quotas were applied for the first time in the municipal elections of 1998. Peru has a two-tier system of municipal government. Voters cast ballots to elect province-level mayors and councilors in each of the 196 provincial capitals of the country. Outside provincial capitals, citizens cast votes to elect mayors and councilors in each district-level municipality— the lowest administrative unit—, a total of 1,642 municipalities as of today. Peruvian municipal elections are held under a closed-list format. The list that captures the relative majority of votes

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(pp. 329–330).

[40]The quota was later increased to 30 percent (in 2000 for the national congress and in 2002 for local elections). See Electoral Laws 27387, 27683, and 27734.

[41]The passage of the gender quota legislation has been poorly documented. The first attempts to introduce gender quotas began in the early 1990s. The discussion generated a process of coalition building, in which Peruvian women from different political organizations joined forces to lobby for a quota law. Htun briefly describes this coalition building process, and finds some similarities to what occurred with the Union for French Democracy in France (Htun, 2004, pp. 446–49). Blondet (2002, pp. 41–42) argues that the Fujimori government strategically advanced the gender equality agenda in order to obtain female electoral support. He was the only head of state that attended the 1995 Fourth World Conference on Women.

is given half the councilors, while the other half is distributed among the other lists under the proportional representation method (D'Hondt rule).

The municipal government consists of the mayor and a team of councilors. Councilors have important executive powers at both levels of municipal government (Nickson, 1995, p. 240): they have jurisdiction over the municipality's internal organization, conduct internal audits and are in charge of managing the municipality's assets and income, taxes, transportation, local public services, urban development, and education systems. The number of councilors depends on the district size—currently, most districts have five councilors. In 1997, a new statute on municipal elections (Electoral Law 26864) standardized council sizes, using population as the exclusive criterion. Between the 1995 and 1998 municipal elections, the average council size, which is equivalent to average district magnitude, was reduced by a third at the provincial level and by more than a fourth in the district-level municipalities of Lima but rose slightly in districts outside the capital.

It is important to note that the quota law excludes the mayor: it requires that 25 percent of the candidates for local councilors to be women or men, but this count does not include the mayor. Therefore, the post-quota proportion of female candidates running for mayors is not expected to increase mechanically. It is also important to point out that, although Fujimori's reelections in 1995 and especially 2000 were controversial processes, the outcomes of municipal elections in the 1990s were broadly accepted by Peruvians of diverse political tendencies. Opposition and local lists won more races than the president's supporters, and allegations of fraud were limited to specific localities (Schmidt and Saunders, 2004, p. 707).

The unanticipated nature of the new electoral rule unleashed an intense search for female candidates to meet the percentages established by law. Women had historically been excluded from leadership positions in political organizations at both national and local levels. In the 1995 elections, for example, only 5.8 percent of the registered candidates for municipal elections were women. The first election subjected to gender quotas (the 1998 municipal election) was scheduled months apart from the passage of the quota law. Therefore, political parties suddenly faced the need to incorporate women in their cadres. They targeted potential female candidates among grassroots organizations, many of which emerged or expanded their networks during the conflict, such as mothers' clubs, popular kitchens, and glass of milk committees. These women were regarded as particularly qualified candidates because they had already acquired some experience

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in the public sector and held leadership positions in their communities (Hurtado, 2005).

The effects of the quota laws in Peru were immediate, and its implementation is generally regarded as a successful one. In the first national election held after the quota, the percentage of congressional seats held by women jumped from 11 to 20 percent. The percentage of female councilors almost doubled at the provincial level and increased by more than a third from already high levels in the municipios of Lima. But what is particularly interesting is that the most spectacular increases took places in municipios outside the capital, i.e., in the violent prone areas, where the female proportion of council members more than tripled. As for the participation, voting turnout increased from 74 to 80 percent in the same time period. This success is noteworthy because the impact of quotas was greater than in many other Latin American countries (Schmidt and Saunders, 2004).

3   Conceptual Framework

Building on the body of work previously reviewed, I develop a number of hypotheses linking wartime violence to women's engagement in the political life of their communities, which may apply to the case of Peru and elsewhere. I focus specifically on women's involvement in local politics, i.e. at the most basic unit of political organization (a municipality in the case of Peru), because such institutions represent the most immediate door of access to the state's resources. Female representation at the macro level, i.e. at national parliaments, is a rather blunt measure of women's involvement in politics, which clouds the micro-dynamics of gender equality in the political arena.[42]

There are several plausible mechanisms by which civil war may affect female political participation. These mechanisms can be broadly grouped into two categories: *structural* and *behavioral* mechanisms. Think of this conceptual distinction as two dimensions of the supply of female candidates that are likely to be affected by wartime violence. For example, the structural dimension captures conflict-induced changes in the sex ratio or household composition, which in

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[42]Understanding the micro-dynamics and the situational contexts of women's exposure to violence is key to make sense of their political behavior in the aftermath of war. For example, Viterna (2013) examines the micro-processes of political mobilization that explain why joined insurgent groups in El Salvador during the 1980s, while other did not. Her account encompasses political and economic factors, the importance of activist strategies, and the role of the collective identities of women that were recruited.

turn affect the relative size of the pool of female candidates. The behavioral dimension captures conflict-induced changes in individual decisions on whether to engage in politics or not.

3.1 Structural Hypotheses Linking Wartime Violence to Female Political Participation

One obvious reason why a larger fraction of women may enter politics during and after war is related to loss of men in the community. Young adult men typically suffer the highest mortality in conflicts. Males are also more likely to be jailed or abducted, creating a shortage of working-age males (including those in power) and a high share of females and widows in the population.[43] Thus, regardless of whether male mortality induces changes in gender roles or incentivizes women to participate more actively in their communities (and therefore in politics), one could argue the mere absence of men in the community generates a higher supply female politicians. We can then formulate the following *demographic mechanism*:

- **H1**: *Violent conflict may increase women's participation in local politics through its negative impact on the ratio of males to females in the community.*

A second mechanism through which violent conflict can induce structural changes that affect the supply of female politicians is institutional. The adoption of new electoral or party rules during or after war may facilitate women's entry into politics. The implementation of electoral gender quotas is, by definition, an institutional change that automatically increases the pool of female candidates. These changes in the political system could be either internally (e.g, as a result of regime change) or externally promoted (e.g., international organizations that mediate the conflict or intervene in the recovery phase). This *institutional mechanism* is as follows:

- **H2**: *Violent conflict may increase women's participation in local politics through institutional changes that facilitate women's entry into politics—e.g., new electoral rules.*

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[43]Furthermore, male ex-combatants (and even males from communities that were seedbed of rebellion) that suffer social ostracism after the conflict may be de facto excluded from political groups.

3.2 Behavioral Hypotheses Linking Wartime Violence to Female Political Participation

In contexts of ideological insurrections that promote gender equality—allegedly in Maoist movements such as the Shining Path, for instance—, an increase in female political participation could take place through indoctrination or spread of the revolutionary ideology—particularly among ex-combatants or supporters of the insurrection.[44] One way of channeling this political awakening is through participation in political life, which results in more women willing to fill political positions. I call this hypothesis the *revolutionary mechanism*:

- **H3**: *Violent conflict may increase women's participation in local politics through the spread of a revolutionary ideology that fosters gender equality.*

It is also plausible that women decide to engage more actively in public life or participate in politics as a way to cope with the adversities of war. For example, female political engagement may be a strategy to cope with income loss or disruptions of public services in the community. Similarly, an influx of qualified female candidates may be generated by women's activity in female-led movements or organizations. This includes movements organized by war victims, associations of mothers whose children were disappeared—e.g., The Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo in Argentina—, grassroots organizations created to alleviate economic needs—e.g., the community kitchens and the mothers' clubs in Peru—, or protests against violence or human rights violations, among several others.[45]

This *coping mechanism* is defined as follows:

- **H4**: *Violent conflict may increase women's participation in local politics out of necessity to cope with wartime adversities.*

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[44]Additionally, either direct or indirect combat experience may provide women with certain organizational skills that they find of valuable use to incorporate in civic or political life after the end of the conflict. It is also possible that women are politicized by serving as soldiers or high-command councils.

[45]Moreover, the political utility of women may increase because their perceived attributes or skills to perform specific tasks are in high-demand during war and postwar periods. For instance, women can be perceived as more cooperative and less corrupt, better interlocutors to human rights movements, more knowledgable about household functioning, or especially adept at providing public goods.

4 Data

The core of the econometric analysis relies on five main pieces of data: (1) an original data set measuring the proportion of female candidates running for local councilors in Peru's municipal elections before and after the adoption of gender quotas; (2) municipality-level data on violent events from the Peruvian TRC; (3) high-resolution geographic data from the FAO used to compute municipal measures of elevation and soil quality; (4) census data from 1981 and 1993 used to construct several socio-economic and demographic characteristics of the municipalities; and (5) electoral data.

4.1 Original Data on Female Candidates in Municipal Elections

One of the key contributions of this study is the construction of a municipality-level data set measuring the proportion of female candidates in both the 1995 (pre-quota) and the 1998 (post-quota) municipal elections. While measures of female political participation in local elections are publicly available for the 2002, 2006, and 2010 elections, such data have not been compiled for previous electoral processes. Fortunately, the Governance Observatory from Peru's National Jury of Elections has electronically archived all the party lists registered for municipal elections, dating back to the 1960s. These lists include the candidate's name, a passport-size headshot photo, and the specific position for which the candidate ran (either mayor or municipal councilor). Additional background information is provided, such as schooling, date of birth, previous electoral experience, and in some cases even the candidate's plan of government can be found. However, the candidate's sex is not explicitly coded.

To create the data set used in this study, I first retrieved all the party lists registered in each Peruvian municipality for both elections (1995 and 1998). The second step was to code the sex of each candidate and identify whether she or he was running for mayor or local councilor. This required to manually code the aforementioned characteristics of almost 100,000 registered candidates. Although the coding was assisted by the use of automated filters to verify that gender-specific first names were correctly coded, the use of automated methods to code the entirety of candidates did not prove to be a reliable procedure, mostly due to the fact that some Peruvian first names are equally given to both males and females. Furthermore, native first names are difficult to code unless one is sufficiently familiar with both Quechua and Aymara names. Therefore,

in addition to using the first name to identify a candidate's sex, looking at the headshot photo served as an additional check in all cases. Additionally, I coded the size of the district (i.e. the number of candidates in the list).

I was able to find this information, for each election, for a total of 1,493 municipalities, which covers 93 percent of the universe of Peruvian municipalities.[46] The final result is a two-period balanced panel data set that comprises 2,986 observations. Figure **??** shows the distribution of the proportion of female candidates in municipal elections before (1995) and after (1998) the adoption of electoral gender quotas.

4.2 Violence Data

I obtained data from the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), which provides information about the location, time, victim, perpetrator, and type of violence for a total of 36,019 unique reports of violent events that took place during the conflict. The TRC was created in 2001 to shed light on the episode of civil war that affected Peru from 1980–2000. The idea was to generate a reconstruction of violent events to seek for accountability over human rights violations. The two-year project was funded by the government, with a budget of around 19 million U.S. dollars, and it was integrated by 13 independent commissioners. One of the main tasks of the TRC was to visit communities affected by the conflict, hold public hearings, and gather testimonies from direct victims, relatives, or witnesses in general. In total, 16,917 testimonies were gathered. These testimonies were individually coded, resulting in a comprehensive report that allows to generate a municipality-year data set of different types of violent events (killings, abductions, disappearances, torturer, and cases of sexual violence) perpetrated by the Shining Path and the state security forces from 1980–2000.[47]

As it has been noted in other studies that use these data, "one of the drawbacks of the [TRC] information is that it comes from a non-random sample. The characteristics of the data-gathering process make this a self-selected sample, since people voluntarily attended the public hearings to tell their stories" (Leon, 2012, p. 999). The sample was comprehensive in terms of territorial coverage, but the public hearings were not based on a random sample of potential

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[46]There were 1,618 municipalities as of 1995.

[47]The data gathered by the TRC are publicly available here: https://sites.google.com/a/pucp.pe/informe-final-de-la-cvr–peru/

victims, relatives, or witnesses. Therefore, I use the presence of violence—and particular types of violence—in a municipality, rather than the intensity.[48] Presence of violence will be defined as the occurrence of at least one violent act in a municipality between 1980 and and 1997 (i.e. before the implementation of gender quotas at the municipal level).

According to the TRC data, within the sample of analysis (i.e. the 1,493 municipalities for which data on female candidates was collected for both the 1995 and 1998 elections) around 30 percent of Peruvian municipalities was affected by Shining Path's violence at some point between 1980 and 1997.[49] About 31 percent experienced violent events perpetrated by state security forces,[50] and 21 percent was affected by both Shining Path and state-led violence.

4.3 Geographic Data

Theories that focus on structural variables to explain the violent conflict suggest that geographic factors, such as irregularities in the terrain—e.g., mountains and dense jungle—, or the presence of natural resources—e.g., oil and diamonds—play a critical role in determining the use of violent methods, and in particular of guerrilla tactics, to fight against the state (Collier, 2007; Ross, 2006; Weinstein, 2005). In fact, several empirical studies in political science have consistently shown that mountainous terrain is an important predictor of civil war (Buhaug and Gates, 2002; Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Hegre and Sambanis, 2006).[51]

The Shining Path was a predominantly rural movement that initiated in Peru's south-central Andes. Even though the movement aimed Lima, the capital city, as a final destination of the rebellion, Shining Path's headquarters remained mostly in the highlands. Since communities in the mountainous regions of Peru may exhibit different patterns of women's participation in politics, relative to urban or flat-terrain areas, it is important to account for the possibility that the gender

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[48]Using the intensity of violence in the analysis is more likely to induce bias in the estimates of the effect of violence if there are unobserved characteristics of the municipalities that lead to higher rates of reporting.

[49]As previously noted, other rebel movements emerged during these years. Most notably, the MRTA, which positioned itself as the second most violent movement after the Shining Path. The MRTA, however, was much smaller and had a very limited geographical reach. Less than 5 percent of the municipalities experienced MRTA-led violence.

[50]This includes the army, the air force, the navy, and the police forces.

[51]As argued by Buhaug and Gates (2002, p. 422), "Rough terrain is ideal for guerrilla warfare and difficult for a government army to control. Mountain areas, giving advantage to rebel troops, allow the rebels to expand the scope of conflict, whereas forests provide cover, particularly against detection or aerial attack. This aids in the freedom of movement and shipment of arms, thereby associated with a wider zone of conflict."

quota law generated a differential response based on terrain characteristics of the municipalities. Therefore, I develop a measure of municipal ruggedness using high-resolution data on elevation from the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) of the United Nations (FAO, 2012).[52] This ruggedness measure is computed as the standard deviation of elevation across all the grid cells contained within a municipality.

Additionally, I construct a variable measuring the average soil quality in each Peruvian municipality, using the Workability data set from the (FAO, 2012). This variable measures land workability constraints that hinder agricultural cultivation, based on exogenous factors such as location-specific geography, rainfall, and temperature over the period 1961–1990.[53] I incorporate this variable to account for the possibility that agricultural potential is correlated with both patterns of women's participation in local politics and the presence of violent conflict.[54]

4.4   Census Data

It is also important to control for socio-economic municipal characteristics that could be correlated with both the presence of civil war and patters of female participation in politics. For example, it has been documented that the first outbreaks of violence originated in rural areas with relatively high schooling levels. This is because the Shining Path started recruiting supporters and combatants from local universities and high schools, based on ideological appeals. Given the strong rural component of Shining Path's movement, it is also important to take into account variation in observable characteristics such as ethnic composition (rural areas tend to be more indigenous than urban ones) and access to public services (as a proxy of local development). Therefore, in addition to population size, I incorporate pre-quota measures of the proportion of households with electricity, average years of education, and the proportion of people whose first language is Spanish, based on data from the 1993 census.

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[52]The raster data are structured using a horizontal grid spacing of 30-arc seconds, which is equivalent to 0.0083 degrees or approximately one kilometer.

[53]The data resolution is also a grid of 30-arc seconds.

[54]In robustness checks I also include measures of average rainfall from 1960–1990 and the percentage of a municipality's area covered by forest, which may lead to significant multicollinearity but do not alter the results.

4.5 Electoral Data

As earlier mentioned, in 1997, a new statute on municipal elections (Electoral Law 26864) standardized council sizes—i.e. the district size or district magnitude—based on population size. Therefore, a municipality's council size was different in 1995 and 1998. This is an important change in terms of the potential effects of the gender quotas because different district sizes lead to different "effective" quota percentages. According to Peru's Electoral Law 26864 (Article 10), if the application of the quota results in a non-integer number, the quota should be raised to the next higher integer. This implies that the effective percentage of female candidates is affected by the number of seats in the council, which varies across municipalities and over time.[55] I take into account this factor by controlling for a municipality's district size in each election.

Relatedly, the degree of fractionalization of the municipal party system may be an important determinant of the proportion of female candidates contesting elections. For example, a municipality with a high number of party lists may be more likely to have a female-led party, or a party running with an explicit agenda on gender issues, than a municipality with a two-party system. Hence, I also control for the effective number of parties (or the effective number of lists), which is computed using the electoral returns from the 1995 (pre-quota) municipal elections. I apply the Laakso and Taagepera (1979) method to estimate the effective number of party lists in each Peruvian municipality.

5 Empirical Strategy

The empirical question to be answered is whether Peruvian municipalities affected by the Shining Path insurgency experienced a differential increase in the proportion of female candidates running for local councilors after the adoption of gender quotas. The estimation of the causal effect of violence is challenging because the Shining Path conflict was not a phenomenon randomly distributed across Peruvian municipalities. In other words, some municipalities were more likely to experience violence than others, and the reasons thad made these municipalities more violence prone may also explain why the implementation of gender quotas was more successful in some

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[55]For instance, suppose there are 5 seats in the council. The 25 percent implies that each list should register at least 1.25 female candidates, and rounding to the next integer this means that at least two candidates in the list must be women. Effectively, this is a 40 percent quota. If there are 7 candidates, the effective quota is 29 percent.

areas than in others.

To credibly isolate the extent to which a civil war legacy explains a municipality's response to the quota, I use a difference-in-differences design with fixed effects. I test whether the proportion of female candidates in local (municipal) elections changed differentially in municipalities affected by civil war violence (treatment group) versus municipalities that remained unaffected (control group), before and after the implementation of the electoral gender quotas. The key assumption of this identification strategy is that, had the Shining Path insurgency not occurred, the proportion of female candidates contesting municipal elections after the quota would have been the same in municipalities that are otherwise identical. This also assumes that pre-quota elections would not be sensitive to the effects of the conflict—despite women's higher inclination to participation, there were barriers to women's entry into party politics. In this regard, it is worth noting that before the adoption of gender quotas the proportion of female candidates in municipal elections was not statistically different in affected versus unaffected municipalities.[56]

The essence of the empirical strategy is captured by Table 1, which shows average proportion of female candidates in conflict-affected municipalities versus peaceful municipalities, before and after the adoption of the quota law. A simple difference-in-differences in means suggests a differential increase of about 4 percentage points in female political participation in conflict-affected areas.

Formally, the basic estimation equation is given by:

$$female_{i,t} = \alpha_i + (violence_i \times quota_t)\delta + quota_t\tau + \mathbf{X}'_{i,t}\phi + \varepsilon_{i,t} \qquad (1)$$

Here, $female_{i,t}$ is the proportion of female candidates in municipality i during election t; α_i represent municipality fixed effects, which control for both observable and unobservable time-invariant characteristics of the municipalities; $violence_i$ is a dummy variable for whether or not a municipality was affected by any type of violent event related to the insurrection from 1980–1997, and $quota_t$ is an indicator variable for the post-quota period (i.e. post-1997), which captures time shocks common to all municipalities. $\mathbf{X}'_{i,t}$ is a vector of additional control variables which varies across specifications. The coefficient of interest is δ, which captures the differential increase in

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[56]The mean proportion of female candidates in the 1995 elections (before the quota) was 0.05 in conflict-affected municipalities and 0.06 in municipalities that did not experience violence—in the 1998 elections (after the quota), these proportions jumped to 0.30 and 0.27, respectively.

the proportion of female candidates in the affected versus non-affected municipalities after the quota. ε_{it} is the usual disturbance term.

To distinguish between violence perpetrated by Shining Path and violence perpetrated by state forces, I also estimate the following equation:

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\begin{aligned}
female_{i,t} \;=\; & \alpha_i + (shining\_path_i \times quota_t)\delta_1 + (state\_forces_i \times quota_t)\delta_2 \qquad (2) \\
& + quota_t \tau + \mathbf{X}'_{i,t}\phi + \varepsilon_{i,t}
\end{aligned}
$$

Here, $shining\_path_i$ is a dichotomous indicator for municipalities that experienced any type violence perpetrated by the Shining Path, and $state\_forces_i$ is a dichotomous indicator for municipalities that experienced violence perpetrated by either military or police forces. I estimate various versions of equations (1) and (2) via OLS, using robust standard errors clustered by municipality. In the robustness checks subsection I provide evidence that the results hold statistically significant and substantively similar using other estimation techniques. Additional specifications are estimated to explore heterogeneous effects based on different types of violence. Descriptive statistics of the key variables used in the analysis can be found in Table 2.

6   Results

In this section I report the main empirical findings, based on estimates from equations (1) and (2) using a vector of control variables that varies across specifications. Next, I present a series of robustness tests to address potential concerns regarding the identification of causal effects. Finally, I examine how different types of violence exert different effects.

6.1   Main Results

I start by reporting estimates from equation (1) in Table 3. Column (1) presents the results without controls. To identify a causal effect, we must rule out the possibility that the association between violence and female political participation is confounded by an omitted variable jointly correlated with the first two. Therefore, in columns (2)–(8), I control for various factors that could be correlated with both the presence of violence and the proportion of female candidates in municipal elections. This includes a municipality's district size in the 1995 and 1998 elections

to account for the fact that different district sizes lead to different "effective" quota percentages. Additionally, I include several cross-sectional variables interacted with the post-quota indicator. This includes pre-quota municipal measures of: log population, ruggedness, soil quality, proportion of households with electricity, mean education years, proportion of Spanish speakers, and party fractionalization.[57]

The data indicate that the proportion of female candidates for local councilors increased differentially in municipalities that experienced violent conflict before the adoption of the quota. The baseline coefficient reported in column (1) of Table 3 suggests at 2.8 percentage-point increase in the proportion of female candidates. While this is a seemingly subtle effect, it is important to consider that the median municipality in Peru registered 30 candidates in the 1998 elections, and several municipalities registered more than a hundred (see Figure 6). A substantive interpretation of these results implies that municipalities in which 36 or more candidates were registered (i.e. the average Peruvian municipality) had one additional women running for office as a result of the conflict.

In table 4, I break the data down by perpetrator (Shining Path versus State Security Forces). Note that the Shining Path effect on female political participation is positive and statistically significant, whereas the effect of state-led violence is negative, smaller in magnitude and not statistically precise (except for the last two models, which show a negative effect significant at the 10% level). The data indicate that the differential increase in female political participation after the quota is essentially taking place in areas that experienced Shining Path's violence, but not necessarily in areas affected by Peru's state forces.

In table 5, I estimate interactive models in order to assess whether the Shining Path effects are conditional on the presence or absence of violence perpetrated by the state. Recall that around 9 percent of the municipalities were affected by Shining Path's violence, but not by state-led violence. Similarly, around 10 percent experienced violence from state security forces, but not from the Shining Path. The results of the interactive models are consistent with those previously reported: larger effects are observed in areas that experienced Shining Path violence but did not suffer from state-led violence.

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[57]See the data section for additional details regarding the construction of these variables.

6.2 Robustness Checks

First, I show that the results are robust to estimation methods other than OLS. All the main specifications in the analysis use a fractional response variable (the proportion of female candidates), which naturally falls between zero and one. One objection to estimating these regressions via OLS is that the predicted values may fall outside the [0, 1] interval. Some researchers have considered using censored normal regression methods, such as Tobit, as a solution to this kind of problems. However, as Baum et al. (2008) point out "this is not an appropriate strategy, as the observed data in this case are not censored: values outside the [0, 1] interval are not feasible for proportions data" (p. 302). An alternative strategy for handling fractional response variables is the GLM approach by Papke and Wooldridge (1993). Tables 6 and 7 show that using either approach produces virtually identical results.

A key part of the argument outlined in this study is that, *ceteris paribus*, the implementation of gender quotas has been more effective in conflict-affected municipalities than in those that remained peaceful because the former group of municipalities experienced a relative increase in the pool of potential female candidates. The empirical analysis confirms this hypothesis by comparing original data from the 1995 (pre-quota) and 1998 (post-quota) elections. Following the logic of this argument, it should be the case that similar effects are observed if we use data from subsequent elections—at least for a short period of time.[58] Since the information on female candidates contesting municipal elections is publicly available for the 2002, 2006, and 2010 elections, it is relatively straightforward to test whether the main effects persist over time. I do so by using the same difference-in-differences approach for each election. I compare the proportion of female candidates in the 1995 elections versus the 2002, 2006, and 2010 elections (separately). The regression estimates presented in Table 8 indicate that the results persist over time, although the magnitude of the effects decreases slightly after 2002.

Even though a number of control variables have been included in the analysis to rule out alternative explanations, one could still argue that an unobserved (or omitted) source of variation in the data is likely to confound the results. To address further concerns regarding potential omitted variable bias, in Table 9 I show that the results are robust to the inclusion of additional control variables. This includes the following (pre-quota) socio-economic municipal measures

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[58]The relative increase in female political participation may fade away over time if the conflict only impacted a small number of cohorts.

interacted with a post-quota indicator: the proportion of agricultural workers, the proportion of households with piped water, the proportion of catholic people, and the average number of children per household, based on data from the 1993 census. Furthermore, I control for additional geographic factors that are plausibly correlated with both the presence of the Shining Path and the level of female political participation. Specifically, I interact the post-quota indicator with a municipality's average rainfall and area covered by forest from 1960–1990, based on data from the FAO (2012).[59]

One legitimate concern is that the effects might be driven by events or policies that took place in a particular region of the country. For example, if strong female-led organizations were activated by the adoption of gender quotas in some conflict-affected regions but not in others, it might be the case that the relationship between conflict and female political participation that we observe in the data is primarily driven by that subset of municipalities. To account for this, I control for region dummies interacted with the post-quota indicator. For this purpose, I divide the country into six macro-regions following the Peruvian Ministry of Commerce and Tourism.[60] This controls for events that affected equally all municipalities within a region in each election. Table 10 confirms that the results hold statistically significant at the conventional levels.[61]

In Table 11 I provide evidence that similar effects (albeit not significant across all models) are observed when using the proportion of female candidates running for mayor as an alternative outcome. Recall that candidates running for mayor are not subject to the quota regulation. Therefore, these findings suggest that women's engagement in politics was activated beyond the scope of the quota itself, and that such engagement was more vibrant in municipalities affected by Sendero.

Finally, I perform a "placebo" test using the proportion of young candidates in the 2002 municipal election.[62] Since I only have data on young candidates for one election, I estimate cross-sectional OLS regressions of the proportion of young candidates on the dichotomous variables of violence, controlling for municipal characteristics as in the previous models. If the reason

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[59]Since the inclusion of these additional controls produces significant multicollinearity, I exclude them from the rest of the econometric analysis.

[60]This classification includes the following macro-regions: northwest, central, southwest, southeast, northeast, and Lima.

[61]The results are qualitatively identical if I use department dummies interacted with the post-quota indicator instead, but these absorb most of the variation in presence of violence.

[62]I choose the 2002 election for reasons of data availability.

why the proportion of female candidates increased differentially in areas that experienced Shining Path violence is because the presence of the insurgency pushed women to engage more actively in political life, this test should a yield a null result. There is no theoretical reason why we should expect the conflict to induce young people to participate in politics. Table 12 confirms null results for the placebo outcome, which bolsters the credibility of the findings previously reported and the idea that the political effects of conflict do vary by gender.

6.3   Heterogenous Effects

The evidence presented thus far suggests opposing effects of Shining Paths's violence versus violence perpetrated by state forces. The presence of the Shining Path is positively correlated with the proportion of female candidates in municipal elections after the quota law, but the presence of state-led violence is not. In fact, as previously shown, the Shining Path effect is significantly amplified in municipalities that did not experience state-led violence. In this subsection, I further explore the heterogeneity of these effects. I test for the effects of different types of violence.

Table 13 indicates that municipalities affected by conflict-related killings (without distinguishing the perpetrator) exhibit a higher proportion of female candidates after the quota. Abductions seem to have a similar effect, but not statistically significant across specifications. In contrast, the presence of sexual violence has a negative and statistically significant effect on female political participation. It is important to emphasize that the Peruvian state forces were predominantly responsible for sexual violations. Within the sample of analysis, 87 percent of the sexual violence events were perpetrated by state security forces—only three municipalities experienced Shining Path-related sexual violence. Moreover, as shown in Table 14, sexual violence has a much stronger negative effect in municipalities that did not experience Shining Path violence.

The straightforward interpretation of these findings is that the positive effects of violence on women's political participation occur in areas where males became the principal target of the conflict. However, such effects are reverted in areas where women were the target, that is in municipalities that experienced sexual violence but did not experience Shining Path violence. Although sexual violence was restricted to a relatively small number of municipalities, this result is consistent with anthropological studies showing that such type of violence inflicted significant trauma in women and their daughters (Theidon, 2004).

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7 Assessing Potential Mechanisms

Did the conflict activate women's engagement in local politics, or did it simply decimate the number of men in politics? In this section, I assess the structural and behavioral hypotheses linking wartime violence to female political participation. I start by empirically testing the *demographic mechanism* (H1). I do so in three ways using pre-quota municipal measures of the proportion of widows and males in the population. First, using data from the 1993 census, I test whether the interaction between the proportion of widows (which naturally increased as a result of the conflict) and the post-quota indicator mediates the effect of Shining Path's violence on female political participation (see Table 15). I then conduct analogous tests using the proportion of male population in 1993 (see Table 16), and the 1981–1993 change in the proportion of male population in the municipality (see Table 17).

While the proportion of widows appears to be a strong predictor of female political participation in columns (1)–(5) of Table 15, the effect goes away when controlling for the proportion of people that speak Spanish as a first language (a proxy for the fraction of indigenous population in the municipality). The other two tests (using the proportion of males in 1993, and the 1981–1993 change in the proportion of males) rule out the possibility of a demographic mechanism at work. As shown in Tables 16 and 17, these regressions yield null results. Thus, taken together, these findings demonstrate that the effects of Shining Path violence on female political participation are not driven by the loss of men in the community or by changes in household composition. Similarly, we can virtually rule out H2, i.e. the *institutional mechanism*, since the adoption of the gender quota was the only institutional changed aimed at increasing women's representation in politics, and it was implemented in all municipalities at the same time.

Based on historical accounts, the evidence points to a behavioral mechanism: traditional social norms changed during wartime. Either as heads of household, community organizers, political activists, or Shining Path combatants, women's roles change dramatically within their communities. The question is whether the relationship between the increase in female political participation and the presence of the Shining Path insurgency is explained by a *revolutionary mechanism* (H3) or a *coping mechanism* (H4). In other words, did the Shining Path encourage gender equality through its revolutionary ideology, or did women increase their participation in local politics to cope with the adversities imposed by the conflict?

The qualitative evidence at our disposal does not support the idea that Shining Path advocated women's equality in politics. As described in the background section, the relationship between Sendero and its female members was predominantly instrumental, and the party did not allow women in positions of power. The mythical image of Shining Path's women as ruthless combatants has likewise been discredited (Stern, 1998). Instead, several qualitative accounts assert that the vast majority of civil resistance groups that emerged during wartime were led by women, such as the mothers' clubs. Women played a decisive role in protesting against violence and in organizing their communities to alleviate economic needs and improve the provision of public services (Coral, 1998). Hence, it seems plausible that women increased their participation in public life to cope with wartime problems.

The conflict directly affected a generation of Peruvian women who were *old enough* to undertake civic and political duties. But if the conflict induced a transformation of gender roles, then the gendered effects of wartime violence on female political engagement could also be observed among a younger generation of women, namely those who were *too young* to be directly affected by the conflict but not too young to be influenced by the change in their mothers political behavior. In other words, women who were exposed to the conflict during their childhood or pre-adulthood may exhibit higher levels of political participation, relative to those who were unexposed, because they observed a greater engagement of their mothers in civic or political life.

Based on different pieces of recent survey data, I provide causal evidence that women who were born and raised in conflict-affected areas exhibit higher levels of civic and political engagement than their counterparts. First, I merge the municipal data on violence with a nationally representative survey conducted in 2008 by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).[63] I then employ a difference-in-differences approach to test whether survey respondents exposed to civil war violence during their childhood present different levels of civic and political engagement than those who were born in a different year in the same municipality and those who were born in different municipality but belong to the same cohort.[64] I define childhood as the age span

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[63]This survey was specifically designed to gauge the "Political Culture of Democracy" in Peru, and hence targeted voting-age adults. It was designed by Vanderbilt University and Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, with field work by APOYO Opinion y Mercadeo. Funding came from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The total sample size is 1,500 individual respondents.

[64]Similar strategies have been used in other studies addressing the impact of civil war on schooling and health. For example, see Chamarbagwala and Morán (2011) and Shemyakina (2011).

ranging from birth to 12 years old.[65]

The estimation of the relationship between childhood exposure to violence and political participation is based on the following reduced-form linear regression for individual i in municipality j and birth year t:

$$y_{i,j,t} = \eta_j + \tau_t + \mathbf{X}'_{i,j,t}\beta_1 + \beta_2 V_{i,j,t} + \omega_{i,j,t} \tag{3}$$

Here, $y_{i,j,t}$ is the outcome of interest (an individual measure of political engagement), η_j represents district fixed effects that control for time-invariant characteristics of the municipalities that may be correlated with both violence exposure and political participation, and τ_t represents year of birth fixed effects to control for specific cohort effects. $\mathbf{X}'_{i,j,t}$ is a vector of covariates, which includes race, mother's race, mother tongue, and an indicator variable of whether the respondent was born and raised in a rural area. The parameter of interest is β_2 and $V_{i,j,t}$ represents transitory shocks of childhood exposure to violence measured as one standard deviation from the mean number of violent events[66] for one's birth district.[67] Since the treatment does not vary much within municipalities, standard errors are clustered at the district level, allowing for non-independence of observations within municipality.

This specification is intended to control for variables that might affect y and are not affected by the treatment. My focus is on answers to four items. The LAPOP survey asked respondents whether they preferred democracy above other forms of governing their country, and whether they voted or not in the last national election. As for the question on support for democracy, individuals could answer (1) strongly disagree, (2) disagree, (3) neither disagree nor agree, (4) agree, or (5) or strongly agree. I use answers to these questions to measure (i) *support for democracy* and (ii) *turnout*, respectively. Similarly, participants were asked to answer whether they had contributed to solve community problems and whether they had attended a union or labor association meeting during the last twelve months. Respondents could choose to answer either (1)

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[65]Following Serbin et al. (1993), gender roles are shaped during early and middle childhood.

[66]I take into consideration all violence acts documented by the TRC.

[67]To be precise, the mean childhood exposure to violence for two respondents born in the same district in years t and $t + 1$ is computed as the average of violence acts in years $(t,...,t+11)$ and $(t+1,...,t+12)$, respectively. As a result, there is no full overlap in the average violence of individuals born in adjacent years or in the same municipality. Mean district violence for a particular respondent is calculated over the 1980-2000 period, which implies that only those respondents aged 27 or younger are considered as treated units.

never, (2) once a week, (3) once or twice a month, or (4) once or twice a year. I interpret answers to these questions as measures of (iii) *community participation* and (iv) *labor association.* In addition to these four outcomes, to construct an index of civic and political participation, I conduct a principal component analysis (now on, PCA).[68] To make the interpretation more understandable, I normalized the resulting index rescaling by the minimum to make all the elements lie between 0 and 1 (highest level of political participation).

Table 18 reports estimates of the effect of childhood exposure to violence upon political participation. For brevity, I do not report coefficient estimates and standard errors on covariates. The results suggest that, all else equal, women who were exposed to Shining Path's violence during their childhood exhibit greater levels of political participation. One standard deviation increase in the treatment variable (exposure to approximately 300 violence acts during childhood) increases the level of political engagement by 0.25 (see column (1) of Panel A). This implies the expected treatment effect for those who experienced the highest levels of violence (i.e. those at the 90th percentile) is about three points in a 10-point scale. Note, in Panel B of Table 18, that the effect of childhood exposure to violence on political participation is statistically indistinguishable from zero among male respondents. This provides compelling evidence that the effects of the Shining Path insurgency on political behavior vary by gender and are transmitted across generations.

8 Discussion

This study shows that, on average, new opportunities for women as political actors may arise during wartime, persist in the postwar period, and be transmitted across generations. However, it is important to emphasize that not all types of violence affect political behavior in the same way. War killings, typically associated with men, tend to have a positive impact on female political participation. Sexual violence induces the opposite effect.

The available evidence suggests that increased female political participation during and after war is not necessarily explained by structural factors in society such as abrupt changes the sex ratio or household composition. Women decide to participate more actively in the political life of their communities as a way to cope with wartime adversities. Put in a different perspective,

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[68]Answers to the four items of interest were weighted using this statistical technique, and the first component (which explains the most variation) was retained.

women attempt to minimize the cost of war by making a behavioral adjustment—a response to pressures, threats, and responsibilities. They become more involved in local-level politics, and gain decision-making power within their households, which further empowers them in the public sphere.

This study also implies that the implementation of gender quotas in post-conflict settings represents a critical institutional choice for the development of gender political equality during the recovery phase and the forthcoming years. Policies aiming at increasing female political participation are important wherever gender inequality exists, but the implementation of such policies is particularly important in conflict-affected areas because of at least three reasons. First, there is—at least potentially—a *design advantage.* Unlike peaceful polities, where the implementation of gender quotas often constitutes an isolated policy change, countries affected by armed violence face the challenge of rebuilding state institutions, or even creating new ones. The introduction of gender quotas does not occur in an isolated manner, since it is typically part of a wider repertoire of reforms, which in principle could be designed from scratch to ensure a coordinated and successful implementation. In other words, new or additional institutional arrangements in the political system may be designed to create demand for women.

Second, post-conflicts setting may also offer an *implementation advantage.* Introducing gender quotas as part of the reconfiguration of the political system is likely to materialize in a successful implementation because the conflict already expanded the pool of qualified female candidates. In contexts where women reposition themselves within the household and the community during wartime, they also acquire a range of leadership skills that empower them as political actors more generally, which make them both more suitable and eager to run for office. Therefore, the implementation of gender quotas is likely to generate an exceptionally vibrant response, as the evidence from Peru shows.

Finally, there is a *high opportunity cost* of not reinforcing female political participation after war. The sudden empowerment that women experience as social and political actors during wartime may vanish, or even be reverted, quickly after the war comes to an end. Gains made during wartime may not be consolidated in the postwar period. Therefore, a unique opportunity to successfully create a more equal representation of women and men in the political arena may be at risk if the reconfiguration of political institutions after the conflict is not accompanied by policies explicitly aiming at incentivizing and formalizing women's political participation.

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Table 1: Proportion of Female Candidates Before and After the Quota

	% female candidates	
	Pre-quota	**Post-quota**
Conflict-affected municipalities	5.5%	**30.3%**
Peaceful municipalities	6.0%	27.1%

Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of Key Variables

Variables	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Proportion of female candidates (panel)	2986	0.176	0.158	0	1
District size (panel)	2986	4.968	1.26	1	15
Violence dummy	2986	0.419	0.494	0	1
Shining Path dummy	2986	0.296	0.457	0	1
State Security Forces dummy	2986	0.308	0.462	0	1
Log. population size	2986	8.217	1.093	4.934	11.744
Log. mean difference in elevation	2952	7.525	1.198	2.258	8.483
Log. soil quality	2958	1.341	0.37	0	2.079
Proportion households with electricity	2986	0.226	0.268	0	0.997
Mean. education years	2986	3.512	0.229	2.414	4.701
Proportion. Spanish speakers	2986	0.637	0.372	0.004	1
Effective no. parties	2986	5.259	1.794	1.651	14.036
Proportion of widows	2986	0.059	0.025	0.013	0.194
Proportion of males	2986	0.504	0.028	0.422	0.733
Change in the proportion of males	2986	0.003	0.023	-0.113	0.137

Notes: See data section for definitions of variables.

Table 3: Main Results: Quota Effect on the Proportion of Female Candidates in Municipal Elections, Conditioning on whether a Municipality Experienced Civil War Violence before the 1998 Elections.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
violence × quota	0.028***	0.026***	0.031***	0.026***	0.024***	0.017**	0.016**
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
quota	0.224***	0.212***	0.357***	0.258***	0.430***	0.343***	0.361***
	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.026)	(0.044)	(0.082)	(0.082)	(0.083)
district size		0.008***	0.012***	0.013***	0.013***	0.012***	0.012***
		(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
population × quota			-0.019***	-0.013***	-0.015***	-0.016***	-0.019***
			(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
elevation × quota				-0.002	-0.004	-0.008**	-0.010***
				(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)
soil quality × quota				0.055***	0.055***	0.044***	0.044***
				(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
electricity × quota					0.008	0.026*	0.020
					(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)
education × quota					-0.041**	0.013	0.011
					(0.017)	(0.020)	(0.020)
spanish × quota						-0.080***	-0.075***
						(0.012)	(0.012)
no. parties × quota							0.005**
							(0.002)
Observations	2986	2986	2986	2986	2986	2986	2986
R^2	0.740	0.742	0.747	0.751	0.752	0.759	0.760
σ	0.070	0.070	0.069	0.069	0.068	0.067	0.067

Notes: Variables not shown in all regressions include municipality fixed effects.
Robust standard errors clustered by municipality are shown in parentheses.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 4: Main Results by Perpetrator: Quota Effect on the Proportion of Female Candidates in Municipal Elections, Conditioning on whether a Municipality Experienced Violence Perpetrated by Shining Path and State Security Forces before the 1998 Elections.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
shining path × quota	0.042***	0.045***	0.042***	0.037***	0.033***	0.030***	0.030***
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
state forces × quota	-0.013	-0.017*	-0.009	-0.010	-0.010	-0.017*	-0.017*
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
quota	0.227***	0.213***	0.343***	0.249***	0.403***	0.314***	0.332***
	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.026)	(0.045)	(0.083)	(0.083)	(0.084)
district size		0.009***	0.013***	0.013***	0.013***	0.013***	0.013***
		(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
population × quota			-0.017***	-0.011***	-0.014***	-0.014***	-0.017***
			(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
elevation × quota				-0.003	-0.004	-0.008**	-0.010***
				(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
soil quality × quota				0.055***	0.056***	0.044***	0.044***
				(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
electricity × quota					0.010	0.028*	0.023
					(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)
education × quota					-0.038**	0.017	0.016
					(0.017)	(0.020)	(0.020)
spanish × quota						-0.082***	-0.077***
						(0.012)	(0.012)
no. parties × quota							0.005**
							(0.002)
Observations	2986	2986	2986	2986	2986	2986	2986
R^2	0.742	0.744	0.748	0.751	0.752	0.759	0.760
σ	0.070	0.069	0.069	0.068	0.068	0.067	0.067

Notes: Variables not shown in all regressions include municipality fixed effects.
Robust standard errors clustered by municipality are shown in parentheses.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 5: Main Results Interacting Perpetrators: Quota Effect on the Proportion of Female Candidates in Municipal Elections, Conditioning on whether a Municipality Experienced Violence Perpetrated by Shining Path, State Security Forces, or Both.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
shining path × quota	0.055***	0.057***	0.057***	0.052***	0.048***	0.045***	0.045***
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
state forces × quota	-0.001	-0.006	0.005	0.004	0.004	-0.003	-0.003
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.013)
s.path × s.forces × quota	-0.027	-0.025	-0.032*	-0.032*	-0.033*	-0.032*	-0.032*
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.017)
quota	0.225***	0.212***	0.345***	0.253***	0.408***	0.319***	0.337***
	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.026)	(0.045)	(0.083)	(0.083)	(0.084)
district size		0.009***	0.013***	0.013***	0.013***	0.013***	0.013***
		(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
population × quota			-0.017***	-0.012***	-0.014***	-0.014***	-0.018***
			(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
elevation × quota				-0.003	-0.004	-0.009**	-0.010***
				(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)
soil quality × quota				0.055***	0.055***	0.044***	0.044***
				(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
electricity × quota					0.009	0.027*	0.022
					(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)
education × quota					-0.038**	0.017	0.016
					(0.017)	(0.020)	(0.020)
spanish × quota						-0.082***	-0.077***
						(0.012)	(0.012)
no. parties × quota							0.005**
							(0.002)
Observations	2986	2986	2986	2986	2986	2986	2986
R^2	0.742	0.744	0.748	0.752	0.753	0.760	0.761
σ	0.070	0.069	0.069	0.068	0.068	0.067	0.067

Notes: Variables not shown in all regressions include municipality fixed effects.
Robust standard errors clustered by municipality are shown in parentheses.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 6: Robustness to Tobit Estimates—compare to results reported in Table 4

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
shining path × quota	0.019***	0.025***	0.021***	0.020***	0.020***	0.018**	0.018**
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
state forces × quota	-0.001	-0.006	0.002	0.000	-0.000	-0.005	-0.006
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
quota	0.230***	0.206***	0.329***	0.293***	0.431***	0.358***	0.381***
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.021)	(0.034)	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.063)
district size		0.016***	0.018***	0.017***	0.017***	0.017***	0.017***
		(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
population × quota			-0.016***	-0.012***	-0.016***	-0.016***	-0.021***
			(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
elevation × quota				-0.010***	-0.008***	-0.012***	-0.014***
				(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
soil quality × quota				0.064***	0.058***	0.049***	0.049***
				(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
electricity × quota					0.061***	0.075***	0.068***
					(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
education × quota					-0.036***	0.008	0.006
					(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.014)
spanish × quota						-0.066***	-0.060***
						(0.009)	(0.009)
no. parties × quota							0.006***
							(0.002)
Observations	2986	2986	2986	2986	2986	2986	2986

Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by municipality are shown in parentheses.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 7: Robustness to GLM Estimates—compare to results reported in Table 4

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
shining path × quota	0.099***	0.137***	0.118***	0.109***	0.108***	0.095***	0.096***
	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)
state forces × quota	-0.010	-0.042	0.006	-0.002	-0.003	-0.028	-0.030
	(0.027)	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.029)
quota	1.876***	1.722***	2.448***	2.192***	2.926***	2.565***	2.688***
	(0.051)	(0.053)	(0.104)	(0.165)	(0.292)	(0.294)	(0.295)
district size		0.104***	0.122***	0.118***	0.118***	0.115***	0.115***
		(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
population × quota			-0.092***	-0.072***	-0.094***	-0.094***	-0.117***
			(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.014)
elevation × quota				-0.042***	-0.033**	-0.051***	-0.062***
				(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.014)
soil quality × quota				0.310***	0.284***	0.241***	0.243***
				(0.049)	(0.047)	(0.045)	(0.045)
electricity × quota					0.286***	0.354***	0.322***
					(0.046)	(0.049)	(0.048)
education × quota					-0.186***	0.029	0.018
					(0.060)	(0.069)	(0.069)
spanish × quota						-0.317***	-0.289***
						(0.046)	(0.045)
no. parties × quota							0.031***
							(0.008)
Observations	2986	2986	2986	2986	2986	2986	2986

Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by municipality are shown in parentheses.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 8: Robustness to Subsequent Elections: 2002, 2006, and 2010

	(1) 1995 vs. 2002	(2) 1995 vs. 2002	(3) 1995 vs. 2006	(4) 1995 vs. 2006	(5) 1995 vs. 2010	(6) 1995 vs. 2010
shining path × quota	0.039***	0.036***	0.020**	0.022**	0.018*	0.020**
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.010)
state forces × quota	-0.026***	-0.020**	-0.014	-0.004	-0.019*	-0.010
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
quota	0.179***	0.261***	0.192***	0.162*	0.192***	0.278***
	(0.005)	(0.092)	(0.005)	(0.097)	(0.005)	(0.097)
district size		-0.003		0.003		-0.002
		(0.004)		(0.004)		(0.004)
population × quota		-0.011**		-0.016***		-0.014***
		(0.005)		(0.005)		(0.005)
elevation × quota		0.003		-0.005		-0.004
		(0.004)		(0.004)		(0.004)
soil quality × quota		-0.019		0.022*		-0.002
		(0.012)		(0.012)		(0.012)
electricity × quota		0.016		0.007		0.039**
		(0.018)		(0.018)		(0.018)
education × quota		0.000		0.044**		0.014
		(0.020)		(0.021)		(0.022)
spanish × quota		-0.003		0.005		-0.002
		(0.014)		(0.013)		(0.014)
no. parties × quota		0.001		0.001		0.000
		(0.003)		(0.002)		(0.002)
Observations	2986	2952	2986	2952	2986	2952
R^2	0.589	0.591	0.614	0.621	0.605	0.610
σ	0.077	0.077	0.077	0.076	0.077	0.077

Notes: Variables not shown in all regressions include municipality fixed effects.
Robust standard errors clustered by municipality are shown in parentheses.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 9: Robustness to Additional Controls

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
shining path × quota	0.038***	0.040***	0.040***	0.037***	0.036***	0.032***	0.032***
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
state forces × quota	-0.011	-0.015*	-0.009	-0.011	-0.011	-0.017*	-0.018*
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
quota	0.135***	0.095*	0.287***	0.252***	0.374***	0.379***	0.391***
	(0.050)	(0.049)	(0.066)	(0.072)	(0.108)	(0.106)	(0.107)
agr. workers × quota	-0.047***	-0.049***	-0.051***	-0.051***	-0.055***	-0.060***	-0.059***
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)
water × quota	0.001	0.000	-0.005	-0.023	-0.024	-0.017	-0.015
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)
children × quota	0.024***	0.028***	0.014*	0.009	0.007	0.005	0.005
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
catholic × quota	-0.087**	-0.074**	-0.087**	-0.097***	-0.097***	-0.096***	-0.094**
	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)
forest × quota	-0.019***	-0.018***	-0.018***	-0.018***	-0.017***	-0.007*	-0.006
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
rainfall × quota	0.020***	0.020***	0.020***	0.026***	0.025***	0.012*	0.011*
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
district size		0.011***	0.013***	0.013***	0.013***	0.013***	0.013***
		(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
population × quota			-0.016***	-0.014***	-0.016***	-0.015***	-0.018***
			(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)
elevation × quota				-0.010**	-0.010**	-0.009**	-0.010**
				(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
soil quality × quota				0.063***	0.064***	0.053***	0.053***
				(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.012)
electricity × quota					0.010	0.028	0.025
					(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.018)
education × quota					-0.027	0.007	0.006
					(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.020)
spanish × quota						-0.071***	-0.069***
						(0.014)	(0.014)
no. parties × quota							0.004*
							(0.002)
Observations	2986	2986	2986	2986	2986	2986	2986
R^2	0.749	0.752	0.755	0.760	0.760	0.764	0.765
σ	0.069	0.068	0.068	0.067	0.067	0.067	0.067

Notes: Variables not shown in all regressions include municipality fixed effects.
Robust standard errors clustered by municipality are shown in parentheses.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 10: Accounting for Region–Quota Effects

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
shining path × quota	0.018**	0.021**	0.021**	0.021**	0.020**	0.022**	0.023**
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
state forces × quota	-0.019**	-0.024***	-0.017*	-0.018*	-0.017*	-0.017*	-0.017*
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
quota	0.225***	0.213***	0.308***	0.329***	0.316***	0.289***	0.299***
	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.027)	(0.049)	(0.087)	(0.088)	(0.089)
northwest region × quota	-0.040***	-0.046***	-0.040***	-0.028**	-0.030**	-0.023*	-0.019
	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.014)
central region × quota	0.029**	0.025**	0.024**	0.035***	0.036***	0.028**	0.027**
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.014)
southwest region × quota	0.025*	0.023*	0.027**	0.041***	0.045***	0.041***	0.043***
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)
southeast region × quota	0.048***	0.045***	0.045***	0.058***	0.057***	0.034**	0.033**
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.015)
northeast region × quota	0.015	0.015	0.024	0.014	0.012	0.019	0.022
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.027)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)
district size		0.011***	0.013***	0.013***	0.013***	0.013***	0.013***
		(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
population × quota			-0.012***	-0.012***	-0.011***	-0.012***	-0.014***
			(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
elevation × quota				-0.012***	-0.013***	-0.012***	-0.013***
				(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
soil quality × quota				0.043***	0.045***	0.044***	0.045***
				(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
electricity × quota					-0.017	-0.004	-0.006
					(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.017)
education × quota					0.004	0.020	0.019
					(0.019)	(0.021)	(0.021)
spanish × quota						-0.042**	-0.041**
						(0.016)	(0.016)
no. parties × quota							0.004*
							(0.002)
Observations	2982	2982	2982	2982	2982	2982	2982
R^2	0.755	0.758	0.760	0.762	0.762	0.763	0.763
σ	0.068	0.068	0.067	0.067	0.067	0.067	0.067

Notes: Variables not shown in all regressions include municipality fixed effects.
Robust standard errors clustered by municipality are shown in parentheses.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 11: Alternative Outcome: Female Running for Mayor

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
shining path × quota	-0.007	0.008	0.014	0.039	0.049*	0.048*	0.048*
	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)
state forces × quota	-0.032	-0.053**	-0.065**	-0.067**	-0.069**	-0.071***	-0.071***
	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)
quota	0.163***	0.094***	-0.099	0.238*	0.240	0.218	0.236
	(0.014)	(0.019)	(0.091)	(0.139)	(0.262)	(0.264)	(0.267)
district size		0.046***	0.041***	0.040***	0.039***	0.039***	0.039***
		(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
population × quota			0.025**	0.013	0.005	0.005	0.002
			(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.013)
elevation × quota				-0.048***	-0.038***	-0.039***	-0.041***
				(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.013)
soil quality × quota				0.087**	0.067*	0.064*	0.064*
				(0.034)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)
electricity × quota					0.166***	0.171***	0.165***
					(0.048)	(0.049)	(0.050)
education × quota					-0.008	0.005	0.004
					(0.050)	(0.055)	(0.055)
spanish × quota						-0.020	-0.016
						(0.034)	(0.035)
no. parties × quota							0.005
							(0.006)
Observations	2986	2986	2986	2952	2952	2952	2952
R^2	0.119	0.142	0.146	0.157	0.165	0.165	0.166
rmse	0.207	0.204	0.204	0.201	0.200	0.200	0.200

Notes: Variables not shown in all regressions include municipality fixed effects.
Robust standard errors clustered by municipality are shown in parentheses.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 12: Placebo Outcome: Proportion of Young Candidates in 2002

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
shining path	0.021**	0.013	0.009	0.011	0.003	0.004	0.004
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
state forces	-0.011	-0.005	0.006	0.008	0.008	0.010	0.010
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
district size		-0.018***	-0.013***	-0.013***	-0.012***	-0.012***	-0.012***
		(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
population			-0.021***	-0.023***	-0.024***	-0.024***	-0.025***
			(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
elevation				0.001	-0.004	-0.003	-0.003
				(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
soil quality				-0.023**	-0.015	-0.012	-0.012
				(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.011)
electricity					-0.048***	-0.052***	-0.054***
					(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)
education					-0.052***	-0.065***	-0.065***
					(0.019)	(0.021)	(0.022)
spanish						0.019	0.021
						(0.013)	(0.014)
no. parties							0.002
							(0.002)
Observations	1493	1493	1493	1476	1476	1476	1476
R^2	0.003	0.037	0.060	0.062	0.079	0.080	0.080
rmse	0.140	0.138	0.136	0.136	0.135	0.135	0.135

Notes: All estimates are based on cross-sectional regressions.

Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 13: Effects for Different Types of Violence

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
killings × quota	0.029***	0.031***	0.028***	0.023**	0.021**	0.022**	0.022**
	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
disappearances × quota	0.004	0.005	0.009	0.009	0.009	0.009	0.009
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
abductions × quota	0.024*	0.024*	0.023*	0.021*	0.021	0.015	0.015
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)
sexual violence × quota	-0.025*	-0.024*	-0.024*	-0.025*	-0.025*	-0.024*	-0.024*
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.014)
torture × quota	-0.012	-0.015	-0.010	-0.010	-0.011	-0.016	-0.016
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
quota	0.226***	0.212***	0.348***	0.255***	0.417***	0.330***	0.348***
	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.026)	(0.044)	(0.083)	(0.082)	(0.083)
district size		0.009***	0.013***	0.013***	0.013***	0.013***	0.013***
		(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
population × quota			-0.017***	-0.012***	-0.015***	-0.015***	-0.018***
			(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
elevation × quota				-0.003	-0.004	-0.009**	-0.010***
				(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
soil quality × quota				0.055***	0.055***	0.043***	0.043***
				(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
electricity × quota					0.010	0.028*	0.023
					(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)
education × quota					-0.039**	0.016	0.014
					(0.017)	(0.020)	(0.020)
spanish × quota						-0.082***	-0.078***
						(0.012)	(0.012)
no. parties × quota							0.005**
							(0.002)
Observations	2986	2986	2986	2952	2952	2952	2952
R^2	0.742	0.744	0.748	0.752	0.753	0.760	0.761
rmse	0.070	0.069	0.069	0.068	0.068	0.067	0.067

Notes: Variables not shown in all regressions include municipality fixed effects.
Robust standard errors clustered by municipality are shown in parentheses.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 14: Effects for Different Types of Violence within Subsample of Municipalities that Did Not Experience Shining Path's Violence

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
killings × quota	0.009	0.011	0.011	0.005	0.004	0.010	0.008
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.020)
disappearances × quota	0.037*	0.037*	0.041*	0.049**	0.049**	0.045**	0.045**
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.022)
abductions × quota	0.009	0.009	0.012	0.020	0.026	0.017	0.017
	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.036)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.036)	(0.036)
sexual violence × quota	-0.103**	-0.102**	-0.095**	-0.081*	-0.079*	-0.088**	-0.089**
	(0.042)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.043)	(0.043)
torture × quota	0.004	-0.004	0.007	0.003	0.003	0.001	0.002
	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)
quota	0.224***	0.209***	0.370***	0.286***	0.471***	0.353***	0.370***
	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.030)	(0.051)	(0.104)	(0.104)	(0.104)
district size		0.010***	0.015***	0.015***	0.015***	0.014***	0.014***
		(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
population × quota			-0.021***	-0.016***	-0.019***	-0.019***	-0.024***
			(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.005)
elevation × quota				-0.006	-0.007*	-0.014***	-0.015***
				(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
soil quality × quota				0.068***	0.070***	0.061***	0.061***
				(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.013)
electricity × quota					0.011	0.023	0.016
					(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)
education × quota					-0.045**	0.027	0.025
					(0.023)	(0.026)	(0.026)
spanish × quota						-0.102***	-0.093***
						(0.015)	(0.015)
no. parties × quota							0.007***
							(0.003)
Observations	2102	2102	2102	2074	2074	2074	2074
R^2	0.711	0.714	0.721	0.727	0.728	0.740	0.742
rmse	0.072	0.072	0.071	0.070	0.070	0.068	0.068

Notes: Variables not shown in all regressions include municipality fixed effects.
Robust standard errors clustered by municipality are shown in parentheses.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 15: Exploring Mechanisms: Main Results by Perpetrator Conditioning on the Proportion of Widows—compare to results reported in Table 4.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
shining path × quota	0.029***	0.031***	0.032***	0.031***	0.030***	0.029***	0.029***
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
state forces × quota	-0.013	-0.018**	-0.014	-0.014	-0.013	-0.017*	-0.017*
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.009)
quota	0.180***	0.158***	0.228***	0.208***	0.306***	0.297***	0.317***
	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.036)	(0.046)	(0.086)	(0.086)	(0.087)
prop. widows × quota	0.857***	0.953***	0.792***	0.698***	0.644***	0.139	0.125
	(0.149)	(0.146)	(0.169)	(0.186)	(0.191)	(0.200)	(0.200)
district size		0.012***	0.013***	0.013***	0.013***	0.013***	0.013***
		(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
population × quota			-0.008**	-0.006	-0.008*	-0.013***	-0.016***
			(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)
elevation × quota				-0.007*	-0.007*	-0.009**	-0.010***
				(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
soil quality × quota				0.048***	0.048***	0.043***	0.043***
				(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
electricity × quota					0.011	0.028*	0.022
					(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)
education × quota					-0.023	0.018	0.016
					(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.020)
spanish × quota						-0.078***	-0.074***
						(0.013)	(0.013)
no. parties × quota							0.005**
							(0.002)
Observations	2986	2986	2986	2986	2986	2986	2986
R^2	0.747	0.751	0.752	0.754	0.754	0.760	0.760
σ	0.069	0.068	0.068	0.068	0.068	0.067	0.067

Notes: Variables not shown in all regressions include municipality fixed effects.
Robust standard errors clustered by municipality are shown in parentheses.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 16: Exploring Mechanisms: Main Results by Perpetrator Conditioning on the Proportion of Males—compare to results reported in Table 4.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
shining path × quota	0.041***	0.044***	0.041***	0.036***	0.033***	0.030***	0.030***
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
state forces × quota	-0.013	-0.017*	-0.009	-0.010	-0.010	-0.016*	-0.017*
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
quota	0.291***	0.290***	0.413***	0.283***	0.404***	0.247**	0.254**
	(0.068)	(0.068)	(0.070)	(0.092)	(0.107)	(0.109)	(0.109)
prop. males × quota	-0.127	-0.153	-0.140	-0.059	-0.002	0.136	0.160
	(0.134)	(0.133)	(0.129)	(0.136)	(0.138)	(0.138)	(0.139)
district size		0.010***	0.013***	0.013***	0.013***	0.013***	0.013***
		(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
population × quota			-0.016***	-0.012***	-0.014***	-0.014***	-0.017***
			(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
elevation × quota				-0.003	-0.004	-0.008**	-0.009**
				(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
soil quality × quota				0.055***	0.056***	0.044***	0.045***
				(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
electricity × quota					0.010	0.030*	0.025
					(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)
education × quota					-0.038**	0.015	0.013
					(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.020)
spanish × quota						-0.084***	-0.079***
						(0.013)	(0.013)
no. parties × quota							0.005**
							(0.002)
Observations	2986	2986	2986	2986	2986	2986	2986
R^2	0.742	0.744	0.748	0.751	0.752	0.760	0.761
σ	0.070	0.069	0.069	0.068	0.068	0.067	0.067

Notes: Variables not shown in all regressions include municipality fixed effects.
Robust standard errors clustered by municipality are shown in parentheses.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 17: Exploring Mechanisms: Main Results by Perpetrator Conditioning on 1981–1993 Change in the Proportion of Males—compare to results reported in Table 4.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
shining path × quota	0.042***	0.045***	0.042***	0.036***	0.033***	0.030***	0.030***
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
state forces × quota	-0.013	-0.017*	-0.009	-0.010	-0.010	-0.017*	-0.017*
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
quota	0.227***	0.213***	0.345***	0.249***	0.401***	0.313***	0.332***
	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.026)	(0.045)	(0.083)	(0.083)	(0.084)
change prop. males × quota	-0.087	-0.078	-0.132	-0.156	-0.145	-0.075	-0.075
	(0.138)	(0.136)	(0.133)	(0.136)	(0.136)	(0.136)	(0.136)
district size		0.009***	0.013***	0.013***	0.013***	0.013***	0.013***
		(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
population × quota			-0.017***	-0.012***	-0.014***	-0.014***	-0.017***
			(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
elevation × quota				-0.003	-0.004	-0.008**	-0.010***
				(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
soil quality × quota				0.056***	0.056***	0.044***	0.045***
				(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
electricity × quota					0.010	0.028*	0.022
					(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)
education × quota					-0.037**	0.017	0.016
					(0.017)	(0.020)	(0.020)
spanish × quota						-0.082***	-0.077***
						(0.012)	(0.012)
no. parties × quota							0.005**
							(0.002)
Observations	2986	2986	2986	2986	2986	2986	2986
R^2	0.742	0.744	0.748	0.751	0.752	0.760	0.760
σ	0.070	0.069	0.069	0.068	0.068	0.067	0.067

Notes: Variables not shown in all regressions include municipality fixed effects.

Robust standard errors clustered by municipality are shown in parentheses.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 18: Childhood Exposure to Violence and Political Participation Outcomes

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	PCA	Support for Democracy	Voted in last election	Community participation	Labor association
Panel A: Female Respondents					
Childhood exposure	0.250***	0.305**	1.108*	0.551***	1.377**
	(0.092)	(0.125)	(0.590)	(0.118)	(0.610)
Observations	550	567	644	589	592
Panel B: Male Respondents					
Childhood exposure	-0.056	0.122	0.260	-0.075	-0.304
	(0.070)	(0.139)	(0.477)	(0.109)	(0.805)
Observations	600	619	646	617	622
Panel C: All Respondents					
Childhood exposure	0.111*	0.083	0.103	0.205**	0.017
	(0.059)	(0.079)	(0.245)	(0.087)	(0.370)
Observations	1150	1186	1290	1206	1214
Pre-treatment controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Cohort indicators	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
District indicators	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Notes: Estimates from column (1) are based on OLS regressions; estimates from columns (2) and (4)-(5) are based on ordered logistic regressions; and estimates from column (3) are based on logistic regressions. Robust standard errors clustered at the district level are shown in parentheses. Pre-treatment controls include: race, mother's race, mother tongue, and an indicator variable of whether the respondent was born and raised in a rural area. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Figure 1: Geographic Expansion of the Conflict

Figure 2: Acts of Violence Over Time, 1980–2000

Figure 3: Conflict Intensity by Type of Violence, 1980–2000

All Violence Acts

1-50
51-200
201-500
501 - +
Not affected

Killings

1-50
51-100
101-200
201 - +
Not affected

Torture

1-20
21-50
51-100
101 - +
Not affected

Disappearances

1-20
21-50
51-100
101 - +
Not affected

Sexual Violence

1
2-10
11-20
21 - +
Not affected

Abductions

1
2-10
11-20
21 - +
Not affected

Figure 4: Proportion of Deaths Attributed to the Shining Path

Figure 5: Pre- and Post-Quota Proportion of Female Candidates

## Pre-Quota (1995 Elections)

Post-Quota (1998 Elections)

Figure 6: Histogram of Municipal Candidates in the 1998 Elections