

Attack When the World Is Not Watching?

International Media and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*

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ABSTRACT

Governments often take unpopular measures. To minimize the political cost of such measures policy makers may strategically time them to coincide with other newsworthy events, which distract the media and the public. We test this hypothesis using data on the recurrent Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Combining daily data on attacks on both sides of the conflict with data on the content of evening news for top U.S. TV networks, we show that Israeli attacks are more likely to be carried out when the U.S. news are expected to be dominated by important (non-Israel-related) events on the following day. In contrast, we find no evidence of strategic timing for Palestinian attacks. The timing of Israeli attacks that we document is suggestive of the intention to minimize next-day news coverage which, as confirmed by comprehensive video content analysis, is especially charged with negative emotional content. We also find that: i) strategic timing of Israeli attacks is less relevant in period of more intense fighting, when the need to quickly retaliate reduces Israel's capacity to time operations strategically; ii) strategic timing is present only for the Israeli attacks that bear risk of civilians being affected; and iii) Israeli attacks are timed to newsworthy events that are predictable.

Keywords: Conflict, mass media, accountability, strategic timing

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1. INTRODUCTION

On August 8 2008, day of the opening ceremony of the Beijing Summer Olympics, Russia initiated the invasion of Georgia. On July 8 2014, day of the FIFA World Cup semifinal between Brazil and Germany, Israeli launched operation “Protective Edge” in Gaza. On July 13 1994, the day Italy qualified to the final of the FIFA World Cup, the government of Silvio Berlusconi passed an emergency decree - the so-called “save-the-thieves” decree - that allowed hundreds of corrupt politicians to avoid jail sentence.

In this paper we argue that the timing of these seemingly unrelated events is hardly a coincidence. Governments are accountable to the extent that the public is informed about their actions. Mass media ensure accountability by informing citizens about government actions (e.g., Besley and Prat, 2006; Snyder and Stromberg, 2010). Yet, how effectively mass media inform the public depends, among other things, on the presence of other newsworthy events that may crowd out the news coverage of governments’ actions (e.g., Eisensee and Stromberg, 2007). To minimize negative publicity policy-makers may strategically manipulate the timing of their unpopular actions so that they coincide with particular moments when the mass media and the public are distracted by other events.¹

This paper aims at testing this proposition focusing on the timing of military operations during an on-going conflict. Military operations often receive negative international publicity, especially when they result in civilian casualties. If the attacker cares about international public opinion and if the conflict is recurrent, this conflict is a good testing ground for strategic timing considerations as time series data exist both on military operations (i.e., the unpopular policy measure) and on the occurrence of other newsworthy events.

Our focus is on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Both Israelis and Palestinians care about international public opinion and recognize the importance of international media in shaping it. Since the 1970s, the Israeli government places a special emphasis on the efforts to project a positive image of Israel and of the Israeli army abroad, a policy known as *hasbara*, Hebrew for “explanation.” This policy encompasses public diplomacy, the work of Israeli government with international journalists in Israel, and the presence of Israeli advocates on

¹ Figure A.1 in the online appendix presents an example of the front pages of three national and international newspapers that covered the three the political events, mentioned above. Noticeably, the space allocated to these events was substantially smaller than that devoted to the sports events with which they coincided.

social media. Arguably, nothing has a stronger negative impact on the international public opinion of any side in a military conflict than the presence of civilian casualties as a result of its military action. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is no exception to this rule; and both sides of the conflict recognize it and acknowledge the role of the media in informing the public about the conflict. This is exemplified by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu who stated in an interview to CNN on July 20 2014, while explaining the heart-wrenching images of civilian Palestinian victims in Gaza: “[*Hamas*] wants to pile up as many civilian dead as they can... they use telegenically dead Palestinians for their cause.”²

The main question of this paper is whether either side of the conflict chooses the timing of its attacks to coincide with other newsworthy international events so as to minimize the negative impact of their actions on international public opinion.

As for Israel, our hypothesis is that Israeli authorities wants to avoid international media coverage of their military operations - especially if and when these may yield civilian casualties - since this may attract criticism from international organizations and human rights activists, and risk to alienate popular support in key partner countries, such as the U.S. Importantly, domestic news coverage (in addition to international news coverage) of the military incidents that lead to civilian casualties is also costly for the domestic popularity of incumbent Israeli government.

As for Palestinian groups, their incentives are *a priori* less clear cut due to countervailing effects of international and domestic publicity. On the one hand, international coverage of Palestinian attacks—especially those resulting in civilian victims—may sway international public opinion in favor of Israel, which serves against the Palestinian cause. On the other hand, however, domestic coverage of the attacks against Israel may foster popular support for terrorist organizations among the Palestinian population, and make it is easier for them to attract new recruits. Furthermore, terrorists are usually interested in higher domestic publicity because it is associated with higher devastation and fear, which presumably is one of the main goals of the terrorist attacks. In addition, Palestinian terrorist attacks are carried out by a number of independent factions, which creates a possibility of coordination problems between them. Thus, in the case of Palestinians, the hypothesis is ambiguous.

² <http://cnnpressroom.blogs.cnn.com/2014/07/20/netanyahu-to-cnns-wolf-blitzer-i-support-taking-whatever-action-is-necessary-to-stop-this-insane-situation/> (accessed on January 19, 2015).

We test these hypotheses using daily time series on the occurrence and the severity of both Israeli military operations in the West Bank and Gaza strip, and attacks by Palestinian militant groups on Israeli territory between 2000 and 2011. These data, which were compiled by two independent human rights organizations, include information on the number of attacks (and the resulting number of casualties) carried out by each side on each day. We combine this information with a measure of the presence of other newsworthy events on international media that may crowd out news coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In particular, we use the direct analogue of the *news pressure* variable first proposed by Eisensee and Stromberg (2007). We compute news pressure as the time devoted to the top three stories, not related to either Israel or Palestine, in the evening news in three U.S. TV networks, NBC, ABC, and CBS. This measure captures the presence of competing news stories on each given day.

As a starting point, we confirm that important attacks in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are often covered by international media and that, as the work of Eisensee and Stromberg (2007) suggests, the probability that the attacks are covered, conditional on their severity, decreases with an increase in news pressure, due to the occurrence of other newsworthy events on the same day. Furthermore, using data on Google searches, we document that TV coverage of Israeli and Palestinian attacks, conditional on their severity, increases the public's attention to the conflict: the daily volume of Google searches for the topic "Israeli-Palestinian conflict" increases by 12% with each additional news story on the conflict featured on U.S. prime-time TV news.

As a next step, we examine how the timing of the attacks (on both sides) is related to the daily international news pressure. We relate the incidence of a deadly attack on a given day by each side in the conflict and its intensity measured by the log number of fatalities to the news pressure recorded on each day around the attack.

Our empirical strategy is based on the assumption that news in the U.S. that are not related to Israel or Palestine - and hence the news pressure variable - are exogenous to actions by both Israelis and Palestinians.

We find that the likelihood of deadly military attacks by Israeli forces against Palestinians, as well as the number of victims they cause, is positively and significantly related

to the level of news pressure on the day after the attack is carried out. This suggests that Israeli authorities may chose the timing of their attacks strategically to minimize negative international publicity. In contrast, we find no evidence that attacks by Palestinian militant groups are timed to U.S. news pressure. The result on the timing of Israeli attacks to news pressure is not driven by the presence of outliers, and is robust to controlling for the retaliation motive of the Israeli attacks (with dummies for the presence of a Palestinian attack in previous days), for seasonality (with calendar month and day of the week fixed effects), and for the general dynamics in conflict intensity (with year fixed effects). Finally, it is robust to accounting for serial correlation by different means, i.e., including lags and leads, adjusting standard errors to Newey-West estimation, or clustering them by month-year.

If the relationship between the Israeli attacks and the U.S. news pressure the following day is, indeed, driven by the strategic timing considerations on the part of Israeli government, several testable implications arise. First, the timing of an attack can only be affected by strategic considerations when the intensity of the conflict is sufficiently low to leave some discretion in choosing when to attack. Our data span across two distinct periods with sharply different intensity of the conflict: 1) the Second Intifada period (September 28, 2000 - February 8, 2005), characterized by very intense violence with deadly attacks occurring, on two out of each three days; and 2) the post-Intifada period (from February 9, 2005 to the end of our sample period), characterized by a much lower intensity of fighting, with the average distance between one Israeli attack and the following one being seven times larger than during Intifada. Given the high intensity of fighting during the Second Intifada, we expect Israel to have had little room for manoeuvre and, therefore, little strategic adjustment of timing of operations to minimize publicity during this period. This prediction finds support in the data: we find that the timing of Israeli operations is significantly affected by news pressure on U.S. media only in the post-Intifada period. We also find that during the Intifada, the timing of the Israeli attacks was more affected by the need to quickly retaliate against Palestinian attacks.³

Second, one should expect only those military operations that are likely to gener-

³ Another much shorter episode of a very intense violence broke out during the Gaza War, also known as the “Operation Cast Lead,” between December 27, 2008 and January 18, 2009. All our results are very similar irrespective of whether we exclude the Gaza War period from the sample.

ate negative publicity to be timed to news pressure. Since the main source of the negative publicity, which sways international public opinion against Israel, is the presence civilian casualties, only the attacks that carry the risk of civilians being affected should be subject to strategic timing. We test this prediction using three alternative measures of whether an attack has *ex ante* a higher risk to result in civilian casualties: 1) the presence or absence of fatalities (*ex post*), 2) the type of the weapon used, i.e. heavy weapons vs. light ammunition, and 3) whether the attack took place in a densely populated area. While only 34.4% of all Israeli military operations result in deaths, this is the case for 68% of the attacks involving heavy weapons (e.g., artillery shells, missiles), and for 49.6% of the attacks, carried out in densely populated areas. We find evidence that only military operations that do result in deaths, in contrast to attacks that do not cause fatalities, are timed to news pressure. We also find the strategic timing effect to be significant only for attacks involving heavy weapons, and for those localized in densely populated areas. Summing-up, the data support the prediction that only serious operations, that are more likely to generate negative publicity due to higher risk of civilian casualties, are strategically timed to minimize media coverage.

Third, in order to time the military operations so that they occur one day before the high news pressure, Israeli authorities should be able to predict news pressure. As the news pressure variable is based on all news stories that do not involve either Israel or Palestine, high news pressure may be due to the occurrence of both predictable newsworthy events (e.g., notable political or sports events), and unpredictable ones (e.g., natural disasters). To test whether Israeli attacks are timed to the predictable component of news pressure, we analyze the text of the headlines of the news stories featured on the days with very high news pressure separately for the days, when an Israeli attack occurred the day before, and the days, when no Israeli attack occurred the day before. We find that in days with high news pressure and no Israeli operation on the day before 46% of all headlines contained words that evoked natural or human-made disasters; in contrast, in days with high news pressure preceded by an Israeli operation, only 12% of the headlines were related to disasters. In contrast, we find that Israeli attacks are more likely to occur prior to days with very high news pressure driven by clearly predictable events (e.g., U.S. holiday shopping). Overall, our analysis suggests that Israeli attacks are timed to news pressure associated with predictable rather

than unpredictable events.

Finally, we examine the mechanism behind the strategic timing effect. In particular, we test alternative explanations for why Israel times its attacks to the news pressure on the following day rather than to the news pressure on the same day. First, we test and reject the hypothesis that news coverage of the conflict on U.S. TV is “slow,” i.e., that Israeli attacks are more likely to appear on the news the day after the attack than on the same day. We find that, on average, twice as many stories about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict appear on the news on the day of an Israeli attack than on the next day.

This suggests that it is not the mere fact that its attacks get covered in the news that the Israeli government is trying to avoid by choosing the timing of the attacks strategically, but, rather, a particular type of coverage of the attacks. Using data on the length of each news story, we examine how much time is devoted by U.S. media to stories about Israeli attacks on the same and on the following day. Despite the fact that Israeli attacks are significantly more likely to appear on the news on the day of the attack than on the following day, the average length of the conflict-related stories is not statistically different between the same and the next day. This is due to the fact that—provided that an attack is covered—conflict-related stories, appearing on the day following an attack, are on average longer than those featured the same day.

To examine the differences in the actual content of the broadcasts of same- vs. next-day, we coded all videos related to Israeli-Palestinian conflict that appeared on prime-time news on two networks, NBC and CNN, between 2000 and 2011 (available from the Vanderbilt Television News Archive). We focused on the type and the form of information provided in each story. Out of total of 582 videos on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, 499 reported on Israeli or Palestinian attacks occurred on the same or on the previous day, 324 reported on Israeli attacks but also spoke about Palestinian attacks, and 201 were about a particular Israeli attack and did not mention any Palestinian attack. Regardless of how we restrict the sample, we find that the type of coverage of Israeli attacks differs substantially (and statistically significantly) between same-day and next-day reports. In particular, while both same-day and next-day news stories are equally likely to report information on the number of victims and the location of the attack, news stories that appear on the day after the attack are much more

likely to present personal life stories of the civilian victims and include interviews with their relatives or friends. Furthermore, next-day coverage is significantly more likely to include emotionally-charged visuals of burial processions and scenes of mourning. In contrast, official reactions by the Israeli authorities about the incident are less likely to be reported in next-day coverage.

Anecdotal evidence suggests that these differences are driven both by technical aspects of news-reporting of armed conflicts, and by local customs and traditions specific to the Middle East. First, when Israel strikes against Palestinian militants, there are usually no international reporters in the vicinity of the target area, and it takes time for them to get on site. Second, even when reporters are nearby, it is often dangerous to reach the actual location of the attack due to the risk of follow-up attacks; for the same reason (potential) witnesses of the attack also hide so that even if journalists arrive on site, finding information quickly can be difficult. Third, it takes time for reporters to uncover the details about what actually happened. Fourth, the local tradition dictates that victims are buried the day after the death. The burial ceremony presents a relatively easy and safe opportunity to produce emotionally-charged footage, as the ceremony takes place in open air and is generally widely attended by the local population. Furthermore, it provides reporters with a good opportunity to access information about the victims, as people who personally knew them participate in the ceremony.

Both the actual informational content (statistics vs. personal stories) and the form in which it is presented (with or without the visual), have very different effect on the recipients of the news. As well-established in the cognitive and social psychology literature, people react more strongly to personal stories than to statistics and dry facts (e.g., Borgida and Nisbett, 1977; Martin and Powers, 1982; Wilkins, 1983), and information transmitted only by means of words is less likely to be retained than information than if accompanied by images (e.g., Mandl and Levin, eds, 1989; Houghton and Willows, eds, 1987a,b; Houts et al., 2006).

Taken together, our findings suggest that Israeli authorities behave strategically in timing their attacks to predictable international newsworthy events in order to minimize negative publicity abroad, and that such strategy is sophisticated in that it takes into account both

the technology of news reporting in war areas and the cognitive psychology of information transmission and retention.

Our research relates to several trends of literature. First, our study contributes to the literature on political accountability and mass media (see, for instance, surveys by Prat and Stromberg, 2013; Sobbrío, 2014). To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first to provide systematic evidence that policy makers act strategically to minimize the negative impact of media reporting of their unpopular actions by manipulating the timing of their actions to coincide with other newsworthy events. Second, our paper contributes to a growing body of work on the role of mass media in conflicts. Economic contributions on the topic have largely focused on estimating the persuasion effects of mass media on conflict (DellaVigna et al., 2014; Yanagizawa-Drott, 2014; Adena et al., 2013). In contrast, historians and political scientists alike have directly addressed the issue of how media may constrain behavior in a conflict environment (see, for instance, a collection of articles in Seethaler et al., eds, 2013), without, however, providing any systematic evidence of the kind presented here. Finally, our paper contributes to the literature on strategic behavior in conflicts both in general (see Blattman and Miguel, 2010; Jackson and Morelli, 2009) and in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, in particular (e.g., Jaeger et al., 2010; Jaeger and Paserman, 2008, 2006, 2009).

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background information on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 presents the results on the relationship between the timing of attacks and news pressure and section 5 provides evidence on the mechanism. Section 6 concludes.

2. BACKGROUND: ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT

Israeli-Palestinian conflict is long-lasting. The fighting on both sides continues with varying intensity since 1948. During our observation period, i.e., between September 29, 2000 and November 24, 2011, it led to 7690 fatalities, including 6401 on the Palestinian side and 1289 on the Israeli side.⁴ The three weeks of Gaza War (or the Operation Cast Lead) between December 27, 2008 and January 18, 2009 was the period of most intense fighting yielding 17.8% all fatalities out of the total death toll during the observation period, namely, 1349

⁴ The fatalities toll excludes the suicide bombers.

Palestinians and 19 Israelis. Figure 1 presents the monthly number of fatalities on both sides of the conflict for the entire observation period and excluding the three weeks of most intense fighting during the Gaza War, which is our baseline sample. Once the Gaza War is excluded, it becomes evident that our sample period covers two stages of the conflict, that differ substantially in terms of intensity of the fighting: the Second Intifada (from the beginning of our observation period up to February 8, 2005) and the Post-Intifada period (from February 9, 2005 onward).⁵ Horizontal lines on the figure present the average number of fatalities per month on both sides of the conflict separately for the two periods, substantially higher during the Second Intifada.

Two observations are important for our story. First, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is characterized by a relatively large number of civilian victims and a relatively large number of minors affected compared to an average military conflict: 47% of all Palestinians casualties and 68% of all Israeli casualties were civilians; 21% of Palestinian casualties and 11% Israeli casualties were children. Second, the conflict attracts a lot of attention by international media. On average, 39 minutes were devoted to Israeli-Palestinian fighting in an average month over our observation period by the evening news on NBC, ABC, and CBS.

3. DATA SOURCES AND MAIN VARIABLES

Our empirical analysis uses data on: i) the timing and characteristics of the attacks by both sides in the conflict, ii) the U.S. TV prime-time news, including the information on the length and keywords of each story appearing daily and the detailed content analysis of news stories about the conflict, and iii) daily volume of Google searches about the conflict.

3.1. DATA ON TV EVENING NEWS IN THE U.S.

3.1.1. NEWS PRESSURE

Daily data on TV prime-time news broadcast by the top four U.S. networks, NBC, ABC, CBS, and CNN, are available from the Vanderbilt Television News Archive for the period

⁵ The Second Intifada ended with an agreement signed by Mahmoud Abbas and Ariel Sharon at the Sharm el-Sheikh Summit.

of 2000-2011.⁶ For each day and each network, the following information is available for every story featured in the evening edition: the order of appearance, the length in seconds, and the keywords, summarizing the topic. We use this information to construct a measure of the presence of other important newsworthy events that are not related to any Israeli or Palestinian actions and may crowd out the coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict on prime-time news. Following Eisensee and Stromberg (2007), we define a variable, called “news pressure,” to be equal to the time devoted to the top three news stories that are in unrelated to Israel and Palestine. First, for each day and each network, we identify news stories that focus on Israel or Palestine or both, i.e., news stories with summaries that contain any mention of Israel or Palestine. In contrast to CNN, which features news around the clock, NBC, ABC and CBS, have a well-defined 30-minute time-slot allocated to evening news. As Eisensee and Stromberg (2007) argued, the fact that this time-slot is limited to 30 minutes allows to measure the importance of newsworthy events featured on the news: more important stories both take longer and appear before less important stories.⁷ Thus, we compute news pressure for each of the three networks with evening edition limited to 30 minutes. On each of these networks, news pressure is set to be equal to the time (in 10 minutes) allocated to top three stories on the days, when Israel and Palestine are not covered by the news. On the days, when Israel or Palestine are covered, the time devoted to all other (unrelated-to-conflict) news gets automatically reduced by the time allocated to the conflict-related stories. Thus, on the days, when Israeli-Palestinian conflict is discussed, the news pressure equals to the length of top three non-conflict-related stories, divided by the time allocated to all non-conflict related stories and multiplied by the total length of news broadcast in order to have comparable units across the days, when the Israel or Palestine are and are not featured by the news.⁸ The examples in Table A.1 in the online appendix illustrate how the news pressure measure is constructed when Israel-or-Palestine-related content is

⁶ Data on FOX News are available for a much shorter period of time.

⁷ The main reason for this is the competition between networks for audience: if the evening news covered less important news first, they would have lost audience to a competitor network that cover more important news at the same time.

⁸ Even though the evening news are limited to 30 minutes, the actual length of time devoted to the news varies somewhat from one day to the next, as weather forecast takes the rest of the time. Our results are completely unaffected by whether we adjust the length of the top-three news stories by the actual length of the news that day minus of the time devoted to Israel/Palestine story or by the median length of time devoted to news on the particular network, again, minus the time devoted to Israel/Palestine.

present and absent from the newscast. Finally, to get daily time series of the news pressure variable, we take the median of the network-specific news pressures on each given day and use 10 minutes as a unit of measurement. As presented in Table A.2 in the online appendix, the news pressure ranges from 2.3 minutes to 29.3 minutes. We plot the the distribution of the daily news pressure in Figure A.2 in the online appendix. As can be seen from the figure, the distribution is substantially skewed to the right. The distance between the median (8.3 minutes) and the 90th percentile (12.3 minutes) is almost twice as large as between the median and the 10th percentile of the distribution (6.1 minutes).

In addition, to the news pressure variable, we use these data to compute various measures of daily news coverage of the conflict events. We identify all stories that are devoted to Israeli-Palestinian conflict and construct the following variables: i) a dummy for any conflict-related story appearing in the news, ii) the average number of conflict-related stories featured in the news, and iii) the average length (in seconds) of the conflict-related stories appearing on the news. Summary statistics for all variables used in the analysis are presented in the Table A.2 in the online appendix.

3.1.2. CONTENT ANALYSIS OF THE NEWS ON CONFLICT

In order to test for the mechanism behind the relationship between news pressure and the timing of the attacks, we collect data on the content of news on the conflict. The Vanderbilt Television News Archive contains the actual videos of evening newscasts of two networks: CNN and NBC. We identified all news stories on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict for our observation period, i.e., from September 29, 2000 to November 24, 2011. To be precise, 582 stories during this time were devoted to the conflict. We asked independent (human) analysts to code the content of these stories. In particular, the analysts filled the questionnaire consisting of 23 questions about the content of these videos. The exact list of the questions and summary statistics for the answers are provided in the Table A.3 in the online appendix. The aim of the questionnaire was to evaluated conflict-related newscasts along several dimensions. In particular, whether the story describes a particular attack, and if so, whether the video reported information about the attack (location, weapon used, number of victims), included footage and personal information of the victims, included images of the victims'

burials and scenes of mourning, included interviews with the victims' relatives or friends, and whether the story gave official reactions by Israeli or Palestinian authorities. Out of 582 video extracts, 499 are related to attacks that occurred on the same or on the previous day, the data on these attacks allow us to analyze the differences in content between news coverage of the attacks on the same and on the next day.

3.2. DATA ON ATTACKS

The data on the attacks come from two sources: the Israeli Information Center for Human Rights, *B'Tselem* (<http://www.btselem.org/>) and the United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, UNOCHA (<http://www.ochaopt.org/>).

B'Tselem data set covers the period between September 29, 2000 and November 24, 2011. It contains information on every attack by Israeli defense forces or Palestinian militants that resulted in fatalities. For each attack the data include information on the day of the attack, the perpetrator, the number of fatal victims, as well as the name, gender, age, and the town of residence for each victim. Additional information regarding the location of the attack, the type of weapon used in the attack, and whether the victim participated in the hostilities is available only for a subset of observations.

UNOCHA data set covers the period between January 3, 2005 and November 24, 2011. It contains more comprehensive information on all attacks by each side, including those that resulted in injuries rather than deaths. It includes comprehensive information on the location of each attack and the type of the weapon used.

We aggregate the data from each of these two sources by date and perpetrator. Hence, we construct daily time series for the following variables: the occurrence of the attacks by each side of the conflict, the number of fatal and non-fatal casualties as a result of the attacks by each side, the occurrence of the attacks involving the use of heavy vs. non-heavy weapons, and the location of the attacks in areas with population density above and below the sample median. The information of occurrence and severity of the deadly attacks is available for the entire period (between 2000 and 2011). Other variables are defined for the shorter period (between 2005 and 2011). In order to differentiate attacks by the type

of weapon used, we define the following weapons as heavy weapons: all types of missiles (air plane missile, helicopter missile, surface-to-surface rocket), sound bombs, explosives, tank shells, shock grenades, and the following weapons as non-heavy: live ammunition, physical assaults, rubber-coated metal bullets, tear gas, etc. (The summary statistics for these variables are presented in the Table [A.2](#) in the online appendix.)

3.3. DATA ON GOOGLE SEARCHES

To construct a measure of the U.S. public's interest in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, we collect data on the volume of conflict-related searches on Google search engine. Google Trends provide high-frequency data on the volume of Google searches for specific queries from 2004 to present. We focus, in particular, on all searches that fall into a *search topic*: "The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict," as defined by Google. When measuring the volume of searches for any particular *search topic*, Google algorithms count many different search queries (i.e., *search terms*) that may relate to the same search topic. Google Trends does provides a measure of the daily volume of searches for each search topic normalized by the highest search volume recorded over a three-month interval of interest. There are no data available on the absolute number of searches. Hence, comparing search volumes for the same topic in different periods requires rescaling of the data using a common scale defined over the global time frame. We used a single query for the search volume at weekly frequency for the entire 7-year period to bring the thirty-two separate daily queries to the same scale. As a result, we were able to construct a daily measure of the search volume for the search topic "Israeli-Palestinian Conflict" for the period between January 2004 and November 2011. (The summary statistics for the volume of Google searches are also presented in the Table [A.2](#) in the online appendix.)

4. ARE ATTACKS TIMED TO NEWS PRESSURE?

4.1. NEWS ON THE CONFLICT ON THE U.S. TV

The first step in our analysis, before we come to the main hypothesis testing, is to test the main premises that lay the foundation for the formulation of our main hypothesis. In particular, we verify whether U.S. TV news cover the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, whether

the unrelated-to-Israel-or-Palestine news pressure affects the coverage of the conflict, and whether conflict-related news on TV matter for drawing public attention to the conflict.

The results presented in the first three columns of Table 1 confirm that the important events in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict do get covered by the U.S. prime-time TV news. We estimate time-series regression specifications, in which we relate the dummy for any news of the conflict, the number of news on the conflict, and the number of seconds devoted to the conflict daily on the evening news to whether an Israeli or Palestinian deadly attack took place the same day or the day before, controlling for year fixed effects, calendar month fixed effects, and day of the week fixed effects. We find that an average Israeli attack with fatalities has a 9 percent chance and an average Palestinian attack with fatalities has an 8 percent chance to appear on any U.S. TV news network. The number of stories appearing on the three networks following an average Israeli and Palestinian attack are 0.18 and 0.27, respectively. The average time allocated to the conflict on the evening news in the U.S. increases by 27 seconds following an Israeli attack and by 50.5 seconds following a Palestinian attack.⁹

The columns 4 to 6 of Table 1 show that, conditional on the severity of the conflict events, news pressure has a negative and significant effect on the likelihood of these events being covered on U.S. TV news. We restrict the sample to the days of the attacks and the days immediately following the attacks and regress our measures of the coverage of the conflict by U.S. TV news (namely, the dummy for any news on the conflict, the number of news on the conflict, and the length of news on the conflict) on the news pressure, controlling for the log numbers of victims, as well as year, calendar month, and day of the week fixed effects. An increase in the news pressure by 4 minutes (equivalent to a shift in the distribution of news pressure from the 75th to the 95th percentile or to a shift from the median to the 90th percentile) leads to a decrease in the probability of any news on conflict of 4.4 percentage

⁹ Note that the Israeli attacks are more frequent and more deadly. The number of the Israeli attacks is 3.5 times larger than of the Palestinian attacks for our period of observation. On average, an Israeli attack causes 4 fatal casualties and a Palestinian attack causes 1.6 casualties. The fact that the US news cover the Palestinian attacks more is consistent with several alternative explanations. It could be related to a pro-Israeli bias of the U.S. media as each attack is less likely to be covered if Israel is the perpetrator. It could also be related to the difference in the frequency of the attacks between the two sides, as the overall time allocated to specific Israeli attacks on prime-time news is substantially larger than that for specific Palestinian attacks: 33 vs. 17 minutes per month, on average, over our observation period. Finally, as we discuss below, it could also be related to the fact that Israel makes a special effort for inform international journalists about the Palestinian attacks and creates favorable conditions, both in terms of access and security, for the journalists to film the aftermath of the Palestinian attacks.

points, a decrease in the number of news stories on conflict by 0.17 and a decrease in the time devoted to the conflict by 41 seconds.

In Table 2 we present evidence that the coverage of the conflict on the U.S. TV news affects the attention of the public in the U.S. to the conflict events. The daily volume of Google searches in the U.S. for the search topic “the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict” significantly increases with the news coverage of the conflict, conditional on the severity of the conflict-related events. If at least one network features a news story about the conflict, the volume of Google searches increases by 8%. The volume of Google searches would increase by 35% if all three networks feature one story about a particular attack compared to the situation, when none of the networks speak about this attack. A 5 minutes worth of stories about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, increase the volume of Google searchers by 24%.

4.2. TESTING OF THE MAIN HYPOTHESIS

Our main hypothesis is that Israel times its attacks to other newsworthy events that may crowd out news coverage of the attacks in order to avoid negative publicity associated with possible collateral damage, and in particular, civilian victims. We can use news pressure from the U.S., as a proxy for the presence of the competing newsworthy events, because Israel cares about public opinion in the U.S. and the U.S. news pressure, as we construct it to be completely unrelated to any stories about Israel or Palestine, is exogenous from the point of view of Israel. Importantly, as we discussed in the introduction, the news coverage of the civilian casualties of Israeli attacks is bad for Israel both internationally and domestically. This is why we can formulate an unambiguous prediction. In contrast, the effect of news pressure on the timing of the terrorist attacks by Palestinian combatants is *a priori* ambiguous. The reason for this is that the news coverage of the terrorist attacks in the international and domestic press can have the opposite effects from the point of view of the Palestinian terrorists. The coverage of the terrorist attacks in international media shifts the international public opinion in favor Israel and, therefore, goes against the goals of the attackers. The coverage of these attacks in domestic media, in contrast, may serve the purpose of the terrorists. As news pressure, in part, depends on the presence of events that are considered newsworthy globally, the domestic and international news pressure may be correlated. Thus, we cannot

formulate an unambiguous prediction about the relationship between the Palestinian attacks and the U.S. news pressure.

Our empirical strategy is straightforward. We regress the measures of the incidence and severity of the attacks by each side in the conflict on the lags and leads of unrelated-to-Israel-or-Palestine news pressure, controlling for the presence of the retaliation motive, seasonality, and overall intensity of the conflict. The retaliation motives were studied earlier by Jaeger and Paserman (2008, 2009). In particular, we estimate the following equation:

$$A_{it} = \sum_{\tau=-7}^7 \alpha_{\tau} NP_{t+\tau} + \gamma_1 A_{j-1} + \gamma_2 A_{j-7} + \gamma_3 A_{j-14} + \eta_{d_t} + \psi_{m_t} + \vartheta_{y_t} + \varepsilon_{it}, \quad (1)$$

where A_{it} is a measure of the incidence or the intensity of an attack by side i (either Israelis or Palestinians) against the opposing side j (either Palestinians or Israelis) on day t and NP_t is the news pressure on day t . A_{j-1} , A_{j-7} , and A_{j-14} stand for the occurrence of the attacks by side j one day before day t , during the period from two days before up to a week before day t , and during the week two weeks before day t , respectively. As a recent attack by the opposing side may lead to a need for retaliation, we include these regressors in the set of controls. η_{d_t} denotes fixed effects for each day of the week, ψ_{m_t} denotes fixed effects for each calendar month, and ϑ_{y_t} denotes year fixed effects. As both the attacks and the news pressure are serially correlated we estimate standard errors with Newey-West estimator or, alternatively, correct them for clusters by month \times year in the error term ε_{it} . Throughout the analysis, we run all regressions on the population of all days in the period under consideration excluding: 1) September 11, 2001, for which news pressure is undefined because, as on that day, the evening edition news far exceeded 30 minutes; and 2) the three weeks of the extraordinarily intense fighting during the Gaza War (i.e., between 12/27/2008 and 01/18/ 2009).¹⁰

Table 3 presents the results of the estimation of equation 1 for the Israeli attacks that caused at least one fatality. The first 5 columns of the table present a linear probability model with the dummy for occurrence of a deadly Israeli attack in a particular day as dependent variable. The last 5 columns consider the intensity of the attack and uses the log number of

¹⁰ We verify that our results do not depend on whether the Gaza War days with extraordinarily intense fighting are included in the sample or excluded from it. We also verify that excluding the days with extraordinary news pressure (i.e. top 0.5% of the distribution), which are mainly the days immediately after 9/11, do not alter our findings.

fatal casualties as a result of an Israeli attack in a given day as dependent variable. The first and the sixth columns present a contemporaneous bivariate relationship: the timing of the incidence and the intensity of the Israeli attacks seem to be positively related to news pressure on the same day. However, this contemporaneous relationship is not robust to accounting for autocorrelation in news pressure, which is necessary as the pairwise correlation coefficient between news pressure and its lag is 56%. Columns 2 to 5 and 7 to 10 include seven lags and seven leads of news pressure as additional regressors (the number of lags is chosen so that there is no residual autocorrelation in the main variables). After adding the full set of lags and leads, we find that it is the news pressure tomorrow (rather than today) that is significantly and robustly related to the occurrence and to the intensity of Israeli attacks. Holding everything else constant, a 4-minute increase in the time allocated to top three non-conflict related news stories increases the probability of an Israeli attack on the previous day by 3 percentage points and increases the death toll from Israeli attacks by 4 percent. These magnitudes are small because they are subject to a severe attenuation bias due to a measurement error in news pressure variable: as we discuss below, Israel could possibly time its attacks only to a predictable component of the news pressure; whereas the unpredictable component is the noise added to the predictable news pressure which creates a classical measurement error and biases the point estimates towards zero. We discuss this issue below. Figure 2 illustrates the results of Table 3 graphically by plotting the magnitude of the coefficients (along with their 95-percent confidence intervals) on the lags and leads of news pressure in the regression with occurrence of an Israeli attack as dependent variable. Even though only the coefficient on the news pressure the day following an attack is statistically significant individually, all 15 coefficients on the 7 lags, 7 leads, and the contemporaneous news pressure are jointly statistically significant at 10% level. The statistical significance of the coefficient on news pressure (on the next day) is consistent with our main hypothesis that Israel times its attacks to international news pressure. In the sections that follow, we examine whether this is indeed the case and what is the mechanism for why the relationship is between the attacks and the news pressure the next day.

An auxiliary result of the analysis presented in Table 3 is that the retaliation motive for the Israeli attacks seems very important: the coefficients on the indicators for the inci-

dence of Palestinian attacks one day, one week, and two weeks prior to a given day are all positive and statistically significant. A fatal Palestinian attack, increases the probability of an immediate (next-day) military response on the part of Israel by 5 percentage points and a response within the next two weeks of 7 percentage points. Importantly, the relationship between the Israeli attacks and the news pressure on the next day is not driven by the presence of any controls or the choice of the functional form. To illustrate this, Figure A.3 in the online appendix presents a bivariate non-parametric relationship between the occurrence of the Israeli attacks (or the log of fatalities) and the news pressure in the following day. The two upper plots present the relationship for the entire sample, and the lower two plots present the relationship for the interval in the news pressure between its mean (8.8 minutes) and the 95th percentile (14 minutes). It is evident from the figure, that the unconditional relationship is positive for the larger part of the distribution.¹¹

Table 4 and Figure 3 replicate the analysis presented in Table 3 and Figure 2 for Palestinian attacks. We find no evidence of a significant relationship between the timing of the fatal Palestinian attacks and the U.S. news pressure. The coefficients on the contemporaneous news pressure or its lags and leads are jointly statistically insignificant. Some of the coefficients occasionally reach statistical significance, but these effects are not robust to changes in the set of covariates and assumptions about variance-covariance matrix, in contrast to a very robust effect of the lead of the news pressure on the timing of the Israeli attacks. We find only one regressor that significantly affects the severity of Palestinian attacks: an incidence of a deadly Israeli attack on a particular day increases the number of victims as a result of a Palestinian attack the following day, and thus, the retaliation motive is important for Palestinian attacks as well.

4.3. TESTING IMPLICATIONS OF STRATEGIC TIMING

In the previous subsection, we presented evidence that the timing of the Israeli attacks is significantly related to the U.S. conflict-free news pressure. Our hypothesis is that this association is a result of strategic behavior of Israeli military. This hypothesis has several

¹¹ As mentioned above, the baseline results are based on the sample that excludes the three weeks of the Gaza War from the sample, online appendix table A.4 replicates the analysis of Table 3 on the full sample, including the Gaza War. The results are robust.

implications that we test in this sub-section.

4.3.1. CONFLICT INTENSITY

If the timing of the Israeli attacks is subject to strategic considerations, we should find an association between the timing of the attacks and news pressure only when there is a room for manoeuvre as far as the timing of the attacks is concerned, namely, when the conflict is not too intense and the need for retaliation is relatively less urgent. As discussed in the background section 2, our sample period covers two distinct periods that differ in the intensity of fighting: the Second Intifada (September 2000-February 8, 2005) and the Post-Intifada period (from February 8, 2005 till the end of our observation period, November 24, 2011). Table A.5 in online appendix illustrates the difference in the intensity of fighting between the two periods: the probability of an attack on a given day during the Second Intifada was 59.7% for Israelis and 18.8% for Palestinians, in contrast, during the Post-Intifada period, the probability of an attack on a given day falls to 24.5% for Israelis and to 6.1% for Palestinians. Figure A.4 in online appendix shows the distribution of days since the last attack by each side of the conflict for the two periods separately. The median number for the Israeli attacks is zero and 3 days for the Second Intifada and Post-Intifada periods, respectively. Thus, in over 50% of the days during the Second Intifada, Israel launched a strike every day, whereas in the Post-Intifada period, for more than 50% of the sample, the frequency of Israeli attacks was lower than every fourth day. Such an intense fighting during the Second Intifada implies that there was no room for strategic timing on the part of Israelis, on average. We find the confirmation of this in the data. Table 5 tests for the relationship between the occurrence and severity of Israeli attacks and U.S. news pressure (estimating equation 1) separately for the two periods. We find that the significance of the effect is entirely coming from the Post-Intifada period. The point estimates of the coefficients on the news pressure are positive, but small and imprecisely estimates for the sub-sample covering the Second Intifada. In contrast, the effects are larger and statistically significant for Post-Intifada sub-sample. The magnitudes imply that Post-Intifada, an increase in news pressure by 4 minutes is associated with an increase in the chance of an Israeli deadly attack a day before by 3.5 percentage points

and an increase in death toll as a result of the Israeli attacks by 4.4 percent.¹²

4.3.2. A RISK OF CIVILIAN CASUALTIES

As the main source of negative publicity for Israel is the presence of civilian casualties as a result of Israeli attacks, strategic timing should only apply to attacks that bear a risk of civilian casualties. The time-series data on whether the victims of the attacks were civilians or not are unavailable. However, the UNOCHA dataset covers all attacks, including those that did not result in fatalities, and it contains detailed information on the location of the attack and the weapon used. Using these data, we construct three alternative proxies for the likelihood that civilians are affected by a particular attack: 1) whether a particular attack resulted in fatal casualties; 2) whether heavy weapons (such as artillery, missiles, rockets, sound bombs, explosives, tank shells, or shock grenades) or non-heavy weapons (such as live ammunition, rubber-coated metal bullets, or tear gas) were used for the attack; and 3) whether the target of the attack is located in the Palestine's governorates with the above-median or below-median population density. Presumably, attacks that result in deaths, are executed with heavy weapons, and target densely-populated areas are more likely to affect civilians. In Table 6, we present the results (the upper panel of the table considers occurrence of Israeli attacks as dependent variable and the lower panel - the severity of the attacks, measured in log number of casualties). In column 1, we present the results of the estimation of the equation 1 for all Israeli attacks, including those that resulted only in injuries. We find no statistically significant association between news pressure the next day and the occurrence or severity of all attacks (the point estimates are positive, but small and imprecisely estimated), in contrast to the significant and strong association between news pressure and the timing and the severity of the deadly attacks, which we presented earlier using *B'Tselem* data, and replicate in column 2 using UNOCHA data and sample. In column 4, we restrict the sample to only densely-populated areas and in column 5 to non-densely populated areas. We find that the news pressure significantly affects the timing and severity of the Israeli attacks in densely populated areas only. In column 6, we use the dummy for whether Israel executed

¹² Table A.6 in the online appendix reports the results for the full sample, including Gaza War. As above the results are robust.

an attack using heavy weapons on a particular day as dependent variable; again, we find that the news pressure the day after the attack is a strong and significant predictor of the attacks executed with heavy weapons and their severity. The results show, again, as expected, that the coefficient on new pressure is larger in magnitude than for any attack suggesting that more serious attacks are more likely to be times to other newsworthy events. Thus, consistent with our hypothesis, all the restrictions that we make on the attacks that increase *ex ante* probability that these attacks affect civilians increase the magnitude and the precision of the estimates of the effect of news pressure on the attacks. Finally, as an illustration, in columns 3 and 7, we restrict the sample to days with no deadly attacks and days with no attacks with heavy weapons, respectively, and relate the remaining attacks and their severity, i.e., non-deadly attacks and attacks without use of heavy weapons weapons, to news pressure. We find no statistically significant relationship, as expected. The results of these four regressions, however, should be interpreted with caution as the sample selection in these regressions is done on the basis of dependent variable (as the most severe attacks are dropped from the sample).¹³ Overall, we find a confirmation to our hypothesis that Israel times to news pressure only those attacks that are likely to result in civilian casualties.

4.3.3. PREDICTABILITY OF THE NEWSWORTHY EVENTS

Not all newsworthy events can be predicted. Many important news stories focus on unexpected events, such as the onset of human-made or natural disasters, with examples ranging from the Columbine High School shooting to Hurricane Katrina or the Gulf of Mexico oil spill. Much of the newscast, however, is devoted to perfectly predictable and well-timed events, such as elections, important speeches by the U.S. leaders, e.g., the State of the Union Addresses, key sports events, e.g., Olympics, FIFA World Cups and Super Bowls, or Black Fridays' shopping. If the association between the timing of the Israeli attacks and U.S. news pressure is explained by the strategic behavior of Israeli military, it can only be driven by the predictable component of news pressure. To test whether this is indeed the case, we analyzed the keywords for the content of the top three news stories on the days when

¹³ At the bottom of Table 6, we present for each considered type of the attacks, its corresponding probability to result in fatal casualties.

news pressure is extraordinarily high; to be precise, we consider days with news pressure between the 98th and 99.5th percentile of its distribution. Figure 4 presents the frequency distribution of the most frequent keywords of the top three news stories separately for the days with and without a deadly Israeli attack on the previous day, i.e., the compliers and non-compliers of the relationship between news pressure and the Israeli attacks. The top 6 keywords among the compliers are: Iraq and War (referring to the then-on-going Iraq war), Campaign, Gore, Bush, Florida, Recount (referring to the important political events in the U.S.); these are perfectly predictable events. The top 6 keywords among the non-compliers are: Hurricane, Earthquake, Coast, Katrina, Japan and Tsunami; all of these keywords refer to different natural disasters, with completely unpredictable onset. We also grouped all keywords for news stories during the extraordinarily high news pressure days into the following six categories: human-made and natural disasters, U.S. political events, Iraq war, holiday shopping, economic news, and other. Figure 5 presents the distribution of keywords among these categories for compliers and non-compliers. As expected, keywords in the category that is perfectly predictable, namely, holiday shopping, are only present among compliers; keywords in the category U.S. politics, which likely refer to predictable events, are more frequent among compliers than among non-compliers; in contrast, keywords in the disasters category, which refer to events that are likely to be unpredictable (especially, in their very beginning), are more frequent among non-compliers. This evidence suggests that Israel times its attacks to predictable newsworthy events, consistent with the hypothesis about its strategic behavior.

5. MECHANISM: COVERAGE OF CONFLICT ON THE SAME VS. NEXT DAY

In this section, we turn to the exploration of the mechanism behind the effect. The main question here is why Israel times its attacks to the level of news pressure on the next day, rather than on the same day. The most obvious potential explanation would be that news may be slow in making and it may take time for the journalists to prepare a story. If the news about important events in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict appeared in the media only one day after their actual occurrence, it would not be surprising that Israel timed its attacks to the news pressure in the following day. We test and reject this hypothesis in columns

1-4 of Table 7. Column 1 restricts the sample to all the days such that there was no deadly Israeli attack the day before and there was no deadly Palestinian attack either the day before or on the same day, and estimates the effect of having a deadly Israeli attack on the number of stories about Israeli-Palestinian conflict that appear the same day on prime-time news of the three U.S. TV networks, controlling for contemporaneous news pressure, day of the week, calendar month and year fixed effects. Column 2 presents a similar regression, which restricts attention to the days such that there was no deadly Israeli attack on the same day and there was no Palestinian attack either on the same day or on the day before, and estimates the effect of having a deadly Israeli attack on the number of stories about Israeli-Palestinian conflict that appear the next day on the three U.S. TV networks (all controls are in column 1). The comparison of the estimated coefficients yields that the news about an Israeli attack does get covered by the U.S. TV news both on the same and on the next day, but the number of stories about the conflict that appear on the same day is twice as large as the number of stories on the next day. Columns 3 and 4 report results of the regressions on the full sample, in which the dummy for news on the conflict and the number of conflict-related news are regressed on indicators of Israeli and Palestinian attacks separately at time t and at time $t - 1$ (conditional on the same covariates). Again, holding everything else constant, we find that an Israeli attack is about twice as likely to be covered on U.S. TV news is large on the day of the attack than on the next day (more precisely, 10.5 vs. 4 percent) and the number of stories that cover the conflict is about twice as large on the day of the attack than on the next day (precisely, 0.23 vs. 0.13 stories).

Evidently, the reason for why Israel times its attacks to news pressure on the next day is unrelated to *whether* the attacks are covered on the same and on the next day, because the coverage of a given attack is more likely to happen on same day. Therefore, the explanation must be related to *how* the attacks are covered on the same and on the next day. If the content of coverage on the next day is less favorable for the public image of Israel, this can explain the association between the timing of the attacks and next-day news pressure. To test this mechanism, we first compare the length of news stories that appear on the same and on the next day. Column 5 of Table 7 shows that, on average, the length of the coverage on the same day and on the next day differ very little, despite a much lower probability of a story

about the attack appearing on the next day. Columns 6 and 7 of Table 7 show why this is the case, by estimating the length of the coverage on the same and on the next day, conditional on the story being covered. In column 6, we restrict the sample to days with news on the conflict. The length of the story on the conflict if it appears on the next day appears to be twice as long compared to when it appears on the same day. In column 7, we use the whole sample, but look at the effect of the interaction between the attacks and the incident of them being covered in the news. Again, we find that the next-day stories are longer, however, the difference is not that stark, as found in column 6.

In order to understand the differences in the actual content of the news stories about the conflict that appear on the same and on the next day, we analyze the coding of the content of all news stories devoted to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict on two networks, NBC and CNN, for the period under study: September 2000 - November 2011. The questionnaires, filled by independent analysts, for each of these 582 videos contained questions about the content of the stories. In particular, whether the stories provided factual information about the number of victims, weapons, location, etc., whether they contained videos or photos of the victims, or videos of the scenes of burial and mourning, interviews with relatives and friends of the victims, and whether the official reaction of Israeli or Palestinian authorities was presented. Table A.3 in the online appendix lists all the questions in the questionnaire and the mean values for the answers. Out of 582 newscasts devoted to the conflict, 326 covered Israeli attacks against Palestinians and 210 of those did not mention any Palestinian attacks in the same story. Only 2 of these 326 stories on Israeli attacks were aired not on the day of the attack or on the following day and 46 were aired on the day following the attack. 156 videos were devoted fully to Palestinian attacks against Israelis and 116 spoke about the attacks on both sides. Overall, 499 videos were devoted to the attacks on either side that occurred on the same or on the previous day. 98 conflict-related videos were not focusing on fighting on either side and instead covered other issues, such as, for instance, peace negotiations. In Table 8, we report the main results of the comparison of the content of stories that appeared on the same and on the next day. Table A.7 in the online appendix presents results of exactly the same specifications estimated for all the remaining variables measuring the content from the questionnaire. In the Panel A of both tables, we confine

the analysis to the most restrictive sample of videos that were devoted to a particular Israeli attack, did not mention any Palestinian attacks, and took place either on the same day or the day before the news story was aired. There are 201 videos like that; out of which 36 were aired on the day following the attack. We present regression results, in which the answers to the questions in the questionnaire are regressed on the dummy for whether the story appeared one day after the attack conditional on network fixed effects. In panel B of both tables, in contrast, we use the entire population of videos and regress the answers to each question about the content on the dummy for whether the video was aired on the next day, controlling for the following list of covariates: a dummy indicating videos that aired neither on the same, nor on the next day (leaving the same-day videos as the comparison group), the interaction between the dummy for whether the video was aired on the next day with the dummy for whether it covered a Palestinian attack, and a dummy indicating whether the story was devoted to a particular attack (rather than, for instance, a series of attacks), and network fixed effects. In both panels, we adjust standard errors to clusters in error terms at the level of each month \times year.

The results of both specifications draw a consistent picture. The only difference in the factual informational content between the same-day and the next-day coverage of the Israeli attacks against Palestinians, that we find, is in the information provided on the *exact* location of the attack, which is 40 percentage points more likely to appear on the next-day news. On average, the exact location of the Israeli attack is reported in 36% of the same-day newscasts as compared to 76% of the next-day newscasts). Other dry facts about the attack, such as the number of victims, including the number of civilian victims or the weapon used are as likely to be reported by the same-day as in the next-day news story. In contrast, personal information about the civilian victims, such as their names and family stories, is significantly more likely to appear on the next-day newscast (the difference is large: 10% of same-day stories report any personal information on civilian victims vs. 30.5% of the next-day stories). The footage of burials and mourning is also significantly more likely to appear on the next-day newscast than on the same-day newscast. In particular, the average rate of appearance of such highly-emotional scenes on there same day is 11%; and on the next day, it is 29%. Interviews with family members, friends of the victims and witnesses

of the incident are also more likely to appear on the next day newscast (in particular, 8% of the same-day stories and 14% of the next-day stories feature such interviews).¹⁴ Finally, we find that the next-day videos are significantly less likely to report the reaction of Israeli authorities about the incident (54% of the same-day videos vs. 34% of the next-day videos). We report the magnitudes based on the most restrictive sample of videos that are devoted to a particular Israeli attack, which takes place either on the same day as the newscast or on the previous day and does not mention any Palestinian attack. From the estimation based on the full sample, in addition, we can conclude that 1) same-day stories about the Palestinian attacks are significantly more likely to contain the basic information about the attack, the personal information about the victims, interviews with witnesses, footage of victims and the reaction of Israeli authorities than the same-day stories about the Israeli attacks, as can be seen from the estimated coefficient on the dummy for the story about Palestinian attack; 2) there is little difference between the content of same-day and next-day videos devoted to Palestinian attacks, as can be seen from the estimated coefficients on the interaction between the next-day coverage and dummy for story about Palestinian attacks (with the exception of the information on the exact location which is more likely to appear on the same-day news story); and 3) stories that appear not on the same or the next day are much less likely to present any information or visuals regarding the attacks on either side, which most likely means that the attacks are not the main focus of these stories.

This evidence on the differences in content strongly suggests the reason why Israel is much more concerned about the next-day compared to the same-day coverage by international media. The next-day coverage is less favorable to Israel. First, the next-day coverage must have an unambiguously more negative effect on the international public opinion about Israeli actions compared to the same-day coverage because it is more emotionally charged. As is well-known in cognitive and social psychology, personal stories, as means of information transmission, are more powerful than dry statistics, as they help the listeners, readers, and viewers to relate to the news story; similarly, and—specific to TV news—the information transmission is more powerful (and in our context, more negative) in the form of visuals

¹⁴ We combine 2 questions about the interviews with witnesses and interviews with friends and relatives in one variable to maximize the variation, as only combined these questions result in sufficient number of videos, which contain interviews.

than in the form of words, as the story seems more real when scenes of mourning by civilians are presented to the viewers. Second, because the next-day stories are focused on the personal stories of civilian victims, Israeli official position less likely to be a part of the newscast. Thus, we conclude that Israeli authorities time their most deadly attacks to international news pressure in order to avoid most emotionally-involved and, therefore, most negative towards Israel, news coverage of civilian fatalities.

Why are there significant differences in the content of international coverage between the same and the next day for the Israeli attacks against Palestinians and no differences in the content of the next-day vs. same-day international news coverage of the Palestinian attacks against Israelis? The differences in the coverage of Israeli attacks are most likely driven by a combination of technological reasons of news-reporting of an armed conflict, i.e., what kind of information is available to journalists immediately after the attack and one day later and the local traditions of burials specific to the Middle East. As for technology of news production is concerned, in the immediate aftermath of the Israeli attacks, most of the time, there are no international journalists in the vicinity, as Israelis do not share their intentions with the journalists. Moreover, even when the journalists are located close to the site of the attack and can quickly get to it, it is often considered dangerous for them and for (potential) witnesses to be on the site because of the risk of repeated strikes. Thus, it is hard for journalists to film on the day of the attack and to find any details about the personalities of victims immediately after the attack. In contrast, the day following the attack, the conditions for journalistic work are very different. Local traditions prescribe burial of victims one day after death occurs. The burial ceremony takes place in open air with many people around. This is an easy and safe opportunity for journalists to access information about the victims. (The fact that there are many people on the street is the best insurance against a possible Israeli attack; and relatives and friends of the victims are present). The funeral is also an easy and safe opportunity to produce an emotionally-charged visual. As some Israelis suggest (see, for instance, the quote from Benjamin Netanyahu, cited above), Palestinians do use the occasion of burials of civilian victims of Israeli attacks in order to tell the international community about them.¹⁵

¹⁵ Note that our sample period ends before the twitter revolution and therefore we cannot analyze how social media, and twitter, in particular, affected the strategic timing effects that we uncover.

The reason why there are no content differences in coverage of the same-day and next-day stories about the Palestinian attacks against Israel also suggest the same conclusion, i.e., Israelis behave strategically. Israelis create conditions for international journalists to access all the necessary information about the Palestinian attacks right after an attack occurs; they bring the international journalists to the site of the attack, allow them to film the site, interview witnesses, and produce visual of the damage and victims. Evidently, Israelis do this because they also realize well the effect of this coverage on international public opinion.

6. CONCLUSIONS

We use the case of recurrent Israeli-Palestinian conflict and its coverage in the international media to find systematic evidence of a strategic behavior of policy makers, who time their unpopular actions to other newsworthy events that distract the public's attention in order to minimize negative publicity as a result of their actions. In the considered case, the policy maker's strategy is developed with full understanding of both cognitive psychology of the effect of the media coverage of conflict on international public opinion and of the technology of war reporting.

We show that Israeli military forces choose the timing of their attacks so that the coverage of burials of (potential) civilian victims coincides with other newsworthy international events. This strategy is used to minimize the negative impact of the Israeli attacks on the assessment of Israel's role in the conflict by international public opinion. We find that the strategic timing is only applied when there is room for it (i.e., the conflict is not very intense) and when there are reasons for it (i.e., when the risk of having civilians affected by an attack is particularly high).


We find no such effect for the Palestinian terrorist attacks, which could be explained by the expected different sign of the effect for the domestic vs. international news pressure or by the lack of coordination among different Palestinian factions involved in violence against Israel, such as Al-Aqsa Martyr Brigades, Hamas, or Palestinian Islamic Jihad, or by the lack of sophistication on the part of terrorists.

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
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FIGURE 1: THE NUMBER OF ISRAELI AND PALESTINIAN FATALITIES BY MONTH WITH AND WITHOUT GAZA WAR, 2000-2011




Note: The figure reports the number of fatal casualties on both sides of the conflict. Shaded area indicates the period of Gaza War. The vertical line marks the end of the Second Intifada. The horizontal lines indicate the average monthly level of fatalities separately for the Second Intifada and the Post-Intifada periods.

FIGURE 2: ISRAELI ATTACKS AND U.S. NEWS PRESSURE (2000-2011)



Note: The figure reports the estimated coefficients (and respective 95% confidence intervals for Newey-West standard errors) from the regression of occurrence of Israeli attacks on news pressure in several days before and after the event (table 1, column 4). The regression includes year, calendar month, and day of the week fixed effects, and controls for Palestinian attacks in the 1, 7 and 14 previous days.

FIGURE 3: PALESTINIAN ATTACKS AND U.S. NEWS PRESSURE (2000-2011)



Note: The figure reports the estimated coefficients (and respective 95% confidence intervals for Newey-West standard errors) from the regression of occurrence of Palestinians attacks on news pressure in several days before and after the event (Table 2, column 4). The regression include year, calendar month, and day of the week fixed effects, and controls for Israeli attacks in the 1, 7 and 14 previous days.

FIGURE 4: MOST FREQUENT WORDS AMONG KEYWORDS FOR DAYS WITH EXTREMELY HIGH NEWS PRESSURE





FIGURE 5: CLASSIFICATION OF FREQUENT WORDS IN HEADLINES FOR DAYS WITH
EXTREME NEWS PRESSURE




TABLE 1: COVERAGE OF ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT
AND U.S. NEWS PRESSURE (2000-2011)

Dependent variable:	Any news on conflict	Number of conflict news	Length of conflict news	Any news on conflict	Number of conflict news	Length of conflict news
Sample:	All days	All days	All days	Attack at t or t-1	Attack at t or t-1	Attack at t or t-1
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Israeli attack (t or t-1)</i>	0.086*** (0.018)	0.181*** (0.043)	26.905*** (7.972)			
<i>Palestinian attack (t or t-1)</i>	0.079*** (0.027)	0.273*** (0.075)	50.506** (20.366)			
<i>News Pressure</i>				-0.111** (0.047)	-0.427*** (0.121)	-103.297*** (28.748)
<i>Ln victims (Isr. attacks t or t-1)</i>				0.081*** (0.011)	0.271*** (0.041)	61.946*** (19.805)
<i>Ln victims (Pal. attacks t or t-1)</i>				0.084*** (0.013)	0.320*** (0.057)	70.159*** (21.530)
Year FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Calendar month FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Day of the week FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	4,051	4,003	4,003	2,443	2,409	2,409
R-squared	0.210	0.209	0.164	0.222	0.276	0.248

Note: In columns 1 to 3 we regress various measures of news coverage of conflict-related stories on U.S. media on dummies for the occurrence of Israeli and Palestinian attacks in the same or previous day; the dependent variables are respectively: a dummy for any conflict-related story appearing on the news (col. 1), the average number of conflict-related stories appeared on the news (col. 2), the average length (in seconds) of conflict-related stories appeared on the news (col. 3). In columns 4 to 6 we restrict the sample to those observations for which an Israeli or Palestinian attack occurred on the same or on the previous day, and regress each of the three measure of news coverage of conflict-related stories on same-day news pressure, controlling for the intensity of the attacks measured by the log of the victims. Data on Israeli and Palestinian attacks are from B'Tselem. Standard errors clustered by month-year reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

TABLE 2: CONFLICT-RELATED NEWS AND GOOGLE SEARCHES (2004-2011)

Dependent variable:	Log Daily Volume of Google Searches for “Israeli-Palestinian Conflict”			
<i>Ln victims Isr. attacks (t, t – 1)</i>	0.037** (0.016)	0.033** (0.016)	0.027* (0.016)	0.029* (0.015)
<i>Ln victims Pal. attacks (t, t – 1)</i>	0.023 (0.017)	0.015 (0.017)	0.010 (0.017)	0.014 (0.016)
<i>Any news on conflict (t, t – 1)</i>		0.080** (0.039)		
<i>Number of conflict news (t, t – 1)</i>			0.115*** (0.035)	
<i>Length of conflict news (t, t – 1)</i>				0.0008*** (0.0002)
Year FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Calendar month FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Day of the week FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Linear time trend	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,392	2,392	2,333	2,333

The table reports the results of a series of regressions of the daily volume of Google searches for the topic “Israeli-Palestinian Conflict” on the intensity and on the news coverage of Israeli and Palestinian attacks perpetrated on the same and on the previous day. Regarding the intensity of attacks, all columns include the log of the victims of Israeli and Palestinian attacks perpetrated on the same or on the previous day. Regarding news coverage, we include: a dummy for whether any conflict-related story appeared on the news on the same or on the previous day (columns 2), ii) the average number of conflict-related stories appeared on the news on the same or on the previous day (col. 3), iii) the average length (in seconds) of conflict-related stories appeared on the news on the same or on the previous day (col. 4). Data on the volume of Google searches are from Google Trends; data on Israeli and Palestinian attacks are from B’Tselem. Since data from Google Trends are only available from 2004, we restrict our attention to the post-Intifada period. Day of the week, calendar month, year fixed effects and a linear time trend are included in all regressions. Corrected Newey-West standard errors are reported in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

TABLE 3: ISRAELI ATTACKS AND U.S. NEWS PRESSURE (2000-2011)

Dependent variable:	Occurrence of Israeli Attacks				Ln casualties of Israeli Attacks					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	Newey-West	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	Newey-West
<i>News Pressure same day</i>	0.073** (0.032)	0.029 (0.034)	0.029 (0.034)	0.027 (0.034)	0.027 (0.036)	0.128** (0.052)	0.024 (0.044)	0.024 (0.044)	0.021 (0.044)	0.021 (0.047)
<i>News Pressure t+1</i>		0.081** (0.036)	0.081** (0.036)	0.076** (0.036)	0.076** (0.035)	0.113** (0.047)	0.113** (0.047)	0.113** (0.047)	0.102** (0.047)	0.102** (0.048)
<i>News Pressure t+2</i>		-0.012 (0.031)	-0.012 (0.031)	-0.011 (0.031)	-0.011 (0.035)		-0.036 (0.041)	-0.036 (0.041)	-0.035 (0.042)	-0.035 (0.047)
<i>News Pressure t+3</i>		0.029 (0.038)	0.029 (0.038)	0.034 (0.038)	0.034 (0.034)		0.069 (0.053)	0.069 (0.053)	0.077 (0.053)	0.077 (0.050)
<i>News Pressure t-1</i>		-0.026 (0.029)	-0.026 (0.029)	-0.027 (0.029)	-0.027 (0.035)		-0.037 (0.039)	-0.037 (0.039)	-0.037 (0.040)	-0.037 (0.046)
<i>News Pressure t-2</i>		-0.022 (0.035)	-0.022 (0.035)	-0.022 (0.035)	-0.022 (0.033)		0.026 (0.048)	0.026 (0.048)	0.025 (0.048)	0.025 (0.047)
<i>News Pressure t-3</i>		-0.033 (0.032)	-0.033 (0.032)	-0.035 (0.032)	-0.035 (0.035)		-0.023 (0.044)	-0.023 (0.044)	-0.023 (0.044)	-0.023 (0.046)
<i>Palestinian attacks (previous day)</i>				0.047* (0.025)	0.047* (0.025)				0.129*** (0.048)	0.129*** (0.045)
<i>Palestinian attacks (previous week)</i>				0.047** (0.023)	0.047** (0.020)				0.101*** (0.034)	0.101*** (0.032)
<i>Palestinian attacks (week before previous)</i>				0.072*** (0.022)	0.072*** (0.021)				0.097*** (0.034)	0.097*** (0.033)
Observations	4,048	4,006	4,006	3,999	3,999	4,048	4,006	4,006	3,999	3,999
R-squared	0.181	0.184	0.184	0.190	—	0.175	0.176	0.176	0.187	—

Note: All regressions include year, calendar month, and day of the week fixed effects. Regression in columns (2)-(5) and (7)-(10) include seven lags and seven leads of news pressure. We exclude observations in the top and bottom 0.5 of the distribution of same-day news pressure in columns (1), (2), (6), and (7), and observations in the top and bottom 0.5 of the distribution of next-day news pressure in the remaining columns. Data on Israeli and Palestinian attacks are from B'Tselem. Standard errors clustered by month-year are reported in parentheses in columns (1)-(4) and (6)-(9); corrected Newey-West standard errors are reported in parentheses in columns (5) and (10). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

TABLE 4: PALESTINIAN ATTACKS AND U.S. NEWS PRESSURE (2000-2011)

Dependent variable:	Occurrence of Palestinian Attacks				Ln casualties of Palestinian Attacks					
	(1) OLS	(2) OLS	(3) OLS	(4) OLS	(5) Newey-West	(6) OLS	(7) OLS	(8) OLS	(9) OLS	(10) Newey-West
<i>News Pressure same day</i>	0.004 (0.018)	0.005 (0.024)	0.005 (0.024)	0.002 (0.024)	0.002 (0.024)	0.003 (0.023)	0.002 (0.029)	0.002 (0.029)	-0.002 (0.029)	-0.002 (0.029)
<i>News Pressure t+1</i>		0.016 (0.024)	0.016 (0.024)	0.016 (0.024)	0.016 (0.026)		0.028 (0.027)	0.028 (0.027)	0.028 (0.027)	0.028 (0.030)
<i>News Pressure t+2</i>		0.040 (0.027)	0.040 (0.027)	0.041 (0.027)	0.041 (0.026)		0.040 (0.031)	0.040 (0.031)	0.040 (0.031)	0.040 (0.029)
<i>News Pressure t+3</i>		-0.036* (0.020)	-0.036* (0.020)	-0.036* (0.019)	-0.036 (0.023)		-0.045* (0.024)	-0.045* (0.024)	-0.045* (0.024)	-0.045 (0.028)
<i>News Pressure t-1</i>		-0.042 (0.026)	-0.042 (0.026)	-0.042 (0.026)	-0.042* (0.025)		-0.040 (0.031)	-0.040 (0.031)	-0.041 (0.031)	-0.041 (0.031)
<i>News Pressure t-2</i>		-0.007 (0.021)	-0.007 (0.021)	-0.006 (0.021)	-0.006 (0.024)		-0.008 (0.023)	-0.008 (0.023)	-0.007 (0.023)	-0.007 (0.027)
<i>News Pressure t-3</i>		0.005 (0.023)	0.005 (0.023)	0.004 (0.023)	0.004 (0.022)		-0.005 (0.026)	-0.005 (0.026)	-0.005 (0.026)	-0.005 (0.025)
<i>Israeli attacks (previous day)</i>				0.015 (0.011)	0.015 (0.011)				0.027* (0.014)	0.027** (0.013)
<i>Israeli attacks (previous week)</i>				0.009 (0.011)	0.009 (0.011)				-0.003 (0.019)	-0.003 (0.019)
<i>Israeli attacks (week before previous)</i>				0.017 (0.011)	0.017 (0.011)				0.013 (0.013)	0.013 (0.013)
Observations	4,048	4,006	4,006	3,999	3,999	4,048	4,006	4,006	3,999	3,999
R-squared	0.083	0.086	0.086	0.087	—	0.076	0.079	0.079	0.080	—

Note: All regressions include year, calendar month, and day of the week fixed effects. Regression in columns (2)-(5) and (7)-(10) include seven lags and seven leads of news pressure. We exclude observations in the top and bottom 0.5 of the distribution of same-day news pressure in columns (1), (2), (6), and (7), and observations in the top and bottom 0.5 of the distribution of next-day news pressure in the remaining columns. Data on Israeli and Palestinian attacks are from B'Tselem. Standard errors clustered by month-year reported in parentheses in columns (1)-(4) and (6)-(9); corrected Newey-West standard errors reported in parentheses in columns (5) and (10). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

TABLE 5: ISRAELI ATTACKS AND U.S. NEWS PRESSURE DURING THE SECOND INTIFADA (2000-2004) AND AFTER IT (2005-2011)

Dependent variable:	Occurrence	Occurrence	Ln Casualties	Occurrence	Occurrence	Ln Casualties
Sample:	During Intifada			Post-Intifada		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>News Pressure (t+1)</i>	0.041 (0.060)	0.029 (0.062)	0.041 (0.092)	0.090** (0.044)	0.088** (0.043)	0.111** (0.053)
<i>Palestinian attacks (previous day)</i>		0.093*** (0.030)	0.215*** (0.056)		-0.041 (0.043)	-0.036 (0.066)
<i>Palestinian attacks (previous week)</i>		0.073** (0.028)	0.152*** (0.046)		0.028 (0.028)	0.076* (0.043)
<i>Palestinian attacks (week before previous)</i>		0.071** (0.031)	0.143*** (0.051)		0.067** (0.027)	0.067* (0.040)
News pressure same day	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
News pressure (lags)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
News pressure (leads)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,571	1,564	1,564	2,435	2,435	2,435
Probability of attack	59.7%	59.7%	59.7%	25.4%	25.4%	25.4%

Note: Day of the week fixed effects, calendar month fixed effects, year fixed effects, same day news pressure, as well as seven leads and seven lags of news pressure are included in all regressions. Corrected Newey-West standard errors reported in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

TABLE 6: ISRAELI ATTACKS AND U.S. NEWS PRESSURE (2005-2011): THE LIKELIHOOD OF CIVILIAN CASUALTIES

Sample:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	All days	All days	Days w/o fatal attack	All days DP areas	All days NDP areas	All days	Days w/o attack w. heavy weapons
<u>Panel A: Occurrence of an attack</u>							
Dep. variable:	All attacks	Fatal attacks	Non-fatal attacks	Attacks in DP areas	Attacks in NDP areas	Attacks w. heavy weapons	Attacks w. light weapons
<i>News pressure (t+1)</i>	0.042 (0.046)	0.101** (0.044)	0.018 (0.058)	0.110** (0.051)	-0.057 (0.052)	0.084** (0.037)	0.037 (0.055)
<u>Panel B: Severity of attacks</u>							
Dep. variable (in logs):	All casualties	Fatalities	Injuries	Casualties in DP areas	Casualties in NDP areas	Casualties w. heavy weapons	Casualties w. light weapons
<i>News pressure (t+1)</i>	0.064 (0.101)	0.148*** (0.053)	-0.105 (0.106)	0.232** (0.096)	-0.112 (0.084)	0.171** (0.071)	-0.039 (0.106)
News pressure same day	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
News pressure (lags)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
News pressure (leads)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Prior Palestinian attacks	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,435	2,435	1,790	2,435	2,435	2,435	1,961
Prob. of fatalities for a type of attack	36.0%	100.0%	0.0%	49.6%	34.0%	69.5%	35.1%

Note: The sample includes all days (columns 1, 2, 4, 5, 6), only days on which no fatal Israeli attack was carried out (column 3), and only days on which no Israeli attack involving the use of heavy weapons was carried out (column 7). Day of the week fixed effects, calendar month fixed effects, year fixed effects, same day news pressure, as well as seven leads and seven lags of news pressure are included in all regressions. The dependent variables in Panel A are: a dummy for whether: i) any Israeli attack was carried out on a given day (column 1), ii) any Israeli attack resulting in fatalities was carried out on a given day (column 2), iii) any Israeli attack not resulting in fatalities was carried out on a given day (column 3), iv) any Israeli attack was carried out in high-population-density areas on a given day (column 4), v) any Israeli attack was carried out in low-population-density areas on a given day (column 5), vi) any Israeli attack involving the use of heavy weapons was carried out on a given day (column 6), vii) any Israeli attack not involving the use of heavy weapons was carried out on a given day (column 7). Dependent variable in Panel B are the natural logarithms of: i) all casualties caused by Israeli attacks carried out on a given day (column 1), ii) fatalities caused by Israeli attacks carried out in a given day (column 2), iii) injuries caused by Israeli attacks carried out on a given day (column 3), iv) all casualties caused by Israeli attacks carried out in high-population-density areas on a given day (column 4), v) all casualties caused by Israeli attacks carried out in low-population-density areas on a given day (column 5), vi) all casualties caused by Israeli attacks involving the use of heavy weapons carried out on a given day (column 6), vii) all casualties caused by Israeli attacks not involving the use of heavy weapons carried out on a given day (column 7). Newey-West adjusted standard errors reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

TABLE 7: SAME-DAY VS. NEXT-DAY NEWS COVERAGE OF CONFLICT EVENTS

Dependent variable:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Number of conflict news		Number of conflict news	Any news on conflict	Number of conflict news	Length of conflict news	Length of conflict news	Length of conflict news
Sample	Days with no Palestinian attack or <i>other</i> Israeli attack at t or $t-1$		All days	All days	All days	Days with news on conflict	All days
<i>Israeli attack at t</i>	0.135*** (0.040)		0.105*** (0.017)	0.230*** (0.044)	35.287*** (10.612)	32.963 (21.783)	
<i>Israeli attack at t-1</i>		0.070* (0.040)	0.040** (0.017)	0.133*** (0.043)	29.692*** (10.294)	63.960*** (22.758)	
<i>Palestinian attack at t</i>			0.104*** (0.026)	0.387*** (0.077)	66.049** (26.646)	72.147* (40.629)	
<i>Palestinian attack at t-1</i>			0.057** (0.025)	0.186*** (0.070)	46.874*** (17.723)	59.540** (27.588)	
<i>Israeli attack at t and conflict covered at t</i>							117.834*** (18.083)
<i>Israeli attack at t-1 and conflict covered at t</i>							141.589*** (22.181)
<i>Palestinian attack at t and conflict covered at t</i>							69.373 (45.487)
<i>Palestinian attack at t-1 and conflict covered at t</i>							73.092** (30.628)
Observations	2,117	2,124	4,047	3,999	3,999	1,106	3,999
R-squared	0.156	0.164	0.221	0.228	0.178	0.216	0.306

Note: In this table we regress various measures of news coverage of conflict-related stories on U.S. media on dummies for the occurrence of Israeli and Palestinian attacks in the same or previous day and news pressure in the same or previous day. The dependent variables are: the average number of conflict-related stories appearing on the news (col. 1, 2 and 6), the average length (in seconds) of conflict-related stories appeared on the news (col. 3, 4, 7 and 8) and a dummy for any conflict related story appearing on the news (col. 5). In columns 1 to 4 we restrict the sample to those observations when there was no Palestinian attack either on the same day or on the previous day. In columns 5 to 8 we use the whole sample. Data on Israeli and Palestinian attacks are from B'Tselem. Standard errors clustered by month-year reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

TABLE 8: DIFFERENCE IN CONTENT BETWEEN STORIES THAT APPEAR ON THE SAME AND ON THE NEXT DAY

Question about:	Info: weapons	Info: exact location	Info: # of civilian victims	Personal info of victims	Video of burials/ mourning	Interview of friends/ relatives or witnesses	Reaction of Israeli authorities
	q11	q12	q14	q19	q20	q21 or q22	q23
Panel A: Sample–stories about a particular Israeli attack on the same day or the day before that do not mention Palestinian attacks							
Dependent variable:							
<i>Next-day coverage</i>	0.0935 (0.0904) 201	0.403*** (0.0759) 201	-0.0502 (0.119) 201	0.205*** (0.0673) 201	0.180** (0.0884) 201	0.0636* (0.0353) 201	-0.197*** (0.0729) 201
Observations	0.007	0.141	0.033	0.071	0.050	0.009	0.106
R-squared	0.71	0.36	0.55	0.10	0.11	0.8	0.54
Panel B: Full sample							
Dependent variable:	q11	q12	q14	q19	q20	q21 or q22	q23
<i>Next-day coverage</i>	0.0593 (0.0839)	0.326*** (0.0810)	-0.0862 (0.0992)	0.191*** (0.0604)	0.128* (0.0686)	0.0504 (0.0360)	-0.138* (0.0771)
Next-day coverage × Palestinian attack	0.0143 (0.113)	-0.388*** (0.116)	0.165 (0.126)	-0.0310 (0.0990)	0.00291 (0.0958)	0.0180 (0.0984)	0.0587 (0.120)
Story appears not on the same day and not the day after	-0.631*** (0.0553)	-0.295*** (0.0651)	-0.466*** (0.0529)	-0.0808*** (0.0348)	-0.0306 (0.0407)	-0.0839 (0.0565)	-0.0810 (0.0778)
Story about a particular attack	0.0270 (0.0466)	0.0831* (0.0492)	-0.0545 (0.0443)	0.00930 (0.0360)	0.0518 (0.0366)	-0.0610 (0.0480)	0.193*** (0.0601)
Story about Palestinian attack	0.147*** (0.0458)	0.252*** (0.0444)	0.103*** (0.0438)	0.0909*** (0.0345)	0.0405 (0.0318)	0.0762*** (0.0354)	0.150*** (0.0688)
Observations	582	582	582	582	582	582	582
R-squared	0.321	0.235	0.189	0.064	0.044	0.037	0.087

Note: The table presents the results of a series of regressions of various the measures of the content of U.S. TV coverage of Israeli military attacks is compared between the same-day and the next-day news coverage. The consider the population of conflict-related stories on NBC and CNN evening news between 2000 and 2011. The content of each video was coded by independent human analysts. The dependent variables are dummies indicating whether the news report includes: i) information on the weapon used in the attack (col. 1), ii) information on the exact location of the attack (col. 2), iii) information on the number of civilian victims of the attack (col. 3), iv) personal information of the victims of the attack(s) (col. 4), v) videos of the victims' burials or scenes of mourning by the victims' relatives or friends (col. 5), vi) interviews with the victims' relatives or friends or with witnesses (col. 6), interviews with the victims' relatives or friends (col. 7), vii) information about the reactions of the Israeli authorities (col. 7). All regressions include network fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by month-year reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The mean responses to the questions for sample of stories about a particular Israeli attack that took place on the same day or the day before and that do not mention Palestinian attacks are presented in the last row of Panel A. The mean responses to the questions for the entire population of videos is presented in Table A.3 in the online appendix.

A. ONLINE APPENDIX

TABLE A.1: CONSTRUCTION OF THE NEWS PRESSURE VARIABLE

Panel A. Israel or Palestine are not on the news:

Date	Network	Headline	Length (secs)	Time to top 3 non-conflict news stories (secs)	News pressure (secs)	News pressure (10 mins)
15Jan2004	CBS	Weather Watch (Extreme Weather)	290	440	440	0.73
15Jan2004	CBS	Iraq / New Government	30	440	440	0.73
15Jan2004	CBS	Atlanta, Georgia / Bush Protests	120	440	440	0.73
15Jan2004	CBS	Campaign 04 / Iowa	160	440	440	0.73
15Jan2004	CBS	Market Watch: Consumer Prices, Inflation, Stocks	20	440	440	0.73
15Jan2004	CBS	Inside Story (Internet Child Pornography)	120	440	440	0.73
15Jan2004	CBS	Space: Mars Exploration	20	440	440	0.73
15Jan2004	CBS	Flu Season	20	440	440	0.73
15Jan2004	CBS	Eye on America (Mad Cow Disease)	200	440	440	0.73
15Jan2004	CBS	Iraq / Homecoming	140	440	440	0.73
15Jan2004	CBS	Good Night	10	440	440	0.73

Panel B. Israel or Palestine are covered in top three stories:

Date	Network	Headline	Length (secs)	Time to top 3 non-conflict news stories (secs)	News pressure (secs)	News pressure (10 mins)
11Jun2003	CBS	Middle East / Israelis vs. Palestinians / Violence	200	430	533.6	0.89
11Jun2003	CBS	Iraq: After Saddam / Weapons of Mass Destruction	120	430	533.6	0.89
11Jun2003	CBS	Economy / Tax Cut Plan	150	430	533.6	0.89
11Jun2003	CBS	Medicine: Monkeypox	160	430	533.6	0.89
11Jun2003	CBS	Shreveport, Louisiana / Hudspeth Shooting	130	430	533.6	0.89
11Jun2003	CBS	International News	70	430	533.6	0.89
11Jun2003	CBS	California / Coma Birth	110	430	533.6	0.89
11Jun2003	CBS	Eye on America (Bon Appetit!)	80	430	533.6	0.89
11Jun2003	CBS	Good Night	10	430	533.6	0.89

Panel C. Israel or Palestine are covered, but not in top three stories:

Date	Network	Headline	Length (secs)	Time to top 3 non-conflict news stories (secs)	News pressure (secs)	News pressure (10 mins)
17-Apr-01	CBS	Economy / Signs of Recovery	160	430	441.7	0.74
17-Apr-01	CBS	Economy / Intel Profit / Cisco Sales	140	430	441.7	0.74
17-Apr-01	CBS	Bush / Environmental Policy / Lead Laws	130	430	441.7	0.74
17-Apr-01	CBS	Middle East / Israelis vs. Palestinians / Violence	30	430	441.7	0.74
17-Apr-01	CBS	US-China Relations / Negotiations	100	430	441.7	0.74
17-Apr-01	CBS	Vietnam / Mia Mission	20	430	441.7	0.74
17-Apr-01	CBS	Foot-and-Mouth Disease / Prevention	140	430	441.7	0.74
17-Apr-01	CBS	Weather Watch (Upper Midwest Floods)	30	430	441.7	0.74
17-Apr-01	CBS	Africa / Slave Ship / Child Slavery	130	430	441.7	0.74
17-Apr-01	CBS	Concorde Test Flight	30	430	441.7	0.74
17-Apr-01	CBS	Health Watch (St. John's Wort and Depression)	110	430	441.7	0.74
17-Apr-01	CBS	Health / Dietary Supplements / Poor	20	430	441.7	0.74
17-Apr-01	CBS	Health / Alcohol and Heart Disease Study	30	430	441.7	0.74
17-Apr-01	CBS	Ellis Island / Immigrant Data Base	50	430	441.7	0.74
17-Apr-01	CBS	Good Night	10	430	441.7	0.74

TABLE A.2: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

Variable	Source	Observations	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
<i>News Pressure (10 mins)</i>	Vanderbilt TV News Archive	4,071	0.886	0.258	0.233	2.933
<i>Presence of conflict-related news stories</i>	Vanderbilt TV News Archive	4,026	0.182	0.386	0	1
<i>Number of conflict-related news stories</i>	Vanderbilt TV News Archive	4,026	0.544	1.117	0	9
<i>Length of conflict related stories (secs.)</i>	Vanderbilt TV News Archive	4,026	78.359	257.612	0	3370
<i>Daily volume of Google searches for "Israeli-Palestinian conflict"</i>	Google Trends	2,833	10.778	9.556	0	117.060
<i>Log daily volume of Google searches for "Israeli-Palestinian conflict"</i>	Google Trends	2,750	2.196	0.616	-0.082	4.763
<i>Occurrence of Israeli attacks</i>	B'Tselem	4,074	0.392	0.488	0	1
<i>Occurrence of Palestinian attacks</i>	B'Tselem	4,074	0.112	0.316	0	1
<i>Number of Israeli attacks</i>	B'Tselem	4,074	0.482	0.659	0	3
<i>Number of Palestinian attacks</i>	B'Tselem	4,074	0.118	0.341	0	3
<i>Fatal victims of Israeli attacks</i>	B'Tselem	4,074	1.571	7.423	0	356
<i>Fatal victims of Palestinian attacks</i>	B'Tselem	4,074	0.316	1.799	0	59
<i>Log fatal victims of Israeli attacks</i>	B'Tselem	4,074	0.493	0.738	0	5.878
<i>Log fatal victims of Palestinian attacks</i>	B'Tselem	4,074	0.122	0.395	0	4.094
<i>Occurrence of Israeli attacks</i>	UNOCHA	2,517	0.755	0.430	0	1
<i>Occurrence of fatal Israeli attacks</i>	UNOCHA	2,517	0.272	0.445	0	1
<i>Occurrence of non-fatal Israeli attacks</i>	UNOCHA	2,517	0.483	0.500	0	1
<i>Occurrence of Israeli attacks with heavy weapons</i>	UNOCHA	2,517	0.191	0.394	0	1
<i>Occurrence of Israeli attacks with light weapons</i>	UNOCHA	2,517	0.697	0.460	0	1
<i>Occurrence of Israeli attacks in high-population-density areas</i>	UNOCHA	2,517	0.453	0.498	0	1
<i>Occurrence of Israeli attacks in low-population-density areas</i>	UNOCHA	2,517	0.573	0.495	0	1
<i>Fatal victims of Israeli attacks</i>	UNOCHA	2,517	0.755	0.430	0	1
<i>Non-fatal victims of Israeli attacks</i>	UNOCHA	2,517	0.483	0.500	0	1
<i>Victims of Israeli attacks with heavy weapons</i>	UNOCHA	2,517	0.191	0.394	0	1
<i>Victims of Israeli attacks with light weapons</i>	UNOCHA	2,517	0.191	0.394	0	1
<i>Victims of Israeli attacks in high-population-density areas</i>	UNOCHA	2,517	3.551	13.096	0	324
<i>Victims of Israeli attacks in low-population-density areas</i>	UNOCHA	2,517	2.868	5.567	0	91
<i>Log fatal victims of Israeli attacks</i>	UNOCHA	2,517	0.334	0.668	0	5.756
<i>Log non-fatal victims of Israeli attacks</i>	UNOCHA	2,517	1.196	1.028	0	5.412
<i>Log victims of Israeli attacks with heavy weapons</i>	UNOCHA	2,517	0.145	0.446	0	3.829
<i>Log victims of Israeli attacks with light weapons</i>	UNOCHA	2,517	0.179	0.415	0	2.773
<i>Log victims of Israeli attacks in high-population-density areas</i>	UNOCHA	2,517	0.706	0.996	0	5.783
<i>Log victims of Israeli attacks in low-population-density areas</i>	UNOCHA	2,517	0.844	0.913	0	4.522

TABLE A.3: QUESTIONNAIRE FOR THE ANALYSIS OF THE CONTENT OF CONFLICT-RELATED VIDEOS

Q#	Question	% Yes
1	First name, gender and age of the person watching the newscast	-
2	Date and time of the newscast	-
3	Network of the newscast	-
4	Does the newscast focus on a particular military attack? (Yes/No)	60
5	Does the newscast focus on an Israeli attack against Palestinians? (Yes/No)	56
6	Does the newscast focus on a Palestinian attack against Israelis? (Yes/No)	47
7	Did this attack occur the same day of the newscast? (Yes/No)	74
8	Did this attack occur on the day before the newscast? (Yes/No)	13
9	Is the newscast based on an on-site report? (Yes/No)	26
10	Is the news correspondent interviewed by the host of the news program? (Yes/No)	10
11	Does the newscast report information about the weapon or weapons used in this attack? (Yes/No)	68
12	Does the newscast report information on the exact location of this attack? (Yes/No)	43
13	Does the newscast report information on the number of victims (if any) caused by the attack? (Yes/No)	69
14	Does the newscast report information on the number of civilian victims (if any) caused by the attack? (Yes/No)	52
15	Does the newscast show images of the actual site of the attack? (Yes/No)	46
16	Does the newscast show footage of the immediate aftermath of the incident? (Yes/No)	31
17	Do photos of the victims of this attack appear in the newscast? (Yes/No)	3
18	Does the newscast show footage of the victims of this attack? (Yes/No)	48
19	Does the newscast report personal information of the civilian victims (e.g. first or last name, age, family situation, etc.)? (Yes/No)	15
20	Does the newscast include footage of burials and/or scenes of mourning by family members? (Yes/No)	12
21	Does the newscast include interviews with witnesses of the accident? (Yes/No)	10
22	Does the newscast include interviews with friends and/or relatives of the civilian victims? (Yes/No)	3
23	Does the newscast report information about the reaction of Israeli authorities to the incident? (Yes/No)	53
24	Does the newscast report information about the reaction of Palestinian authorities to the incident? (Yes/No)	34
25	Overall, how emotional is the newscast on a hypothetical scale from 1 to 4, where 1 is not emotional at all (i.e. just dry information), 2 just a little bit emotional, 3 emotional, 4 very emotional?	-
26	Overall, how would you assess the tone of the newscast on a hypothetical scale from -3 to 3, where -3 is very pro-Palestine, -2 is pro-Palestine, -1 is somewhat pro-Palestine, 0 is neutral, 1 is somewhat pro-Israel; 2-is pro-Israel; and 3-very pro-Israel?	-

Note: The total number of responses to each question is 582. The distribution of answers to q25 is as follows: “-3” 1; “-2” 18; “-1” 20; “0” 509; “1” 14; “2” 19; “3” 1; the distribution of answers to q26 is as follows: “0” 17; “1” 407; “2” 100; “3” 58.

TABLE A.4: ISRAELI ATTACKS AND U.S. NEWS PRESSURE (2000-2011), WITH FULL SAMPLE

Dependent variable:	Occurrence of Israeli Attacks				Ln casualties of Israeli Attacks					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	Newey-West	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	Newey-West
<i>News Pressure same day</i>	0.070** (0.032)	0.028 (0.034)	0.028 (0.034)	0.026 (0.034)	0.026 (0.036)	0.128** (0.052)	0.016 (0.044)	0.016 (0.044)	0.013 (0.045)	0.013 (0.049)
<i>News Pressure t+1</i>		0.080** (0.035)	0.080** (0.035)	0.075** (0.036)	0.075** (0.035)		0.117** (0.047)	0.117** (0.047)	0.104** (0.047)	0.104** (0.049)
<i>News Pressure t+2</i>		-0.006 (0.031)	-0.006 (0.031)	-0.005 (0.031)	-0.005 (0.035)		-0.028 (0.044)	-0.028 (0.044)	-0.026 (0.046)	-0.026 (0.051)
<i>News Pressure t+3</i>		0.032 (0.038)	0.032 (0.038)	0.036 (0.037)	0.036 (0.034)		0.089 (0.055)	0.089 (0.055)	0.097* (0.055)	0.097* (0.053)
<i>News Pressure t-1</i>		-0.028 (0.029)	-0.028 (0.029)	-0.028 (0.029)	-0.028 (0.035)		-0.037 (0.043)	-0.037 (0.043)	-0.038 (0.044)	-0.038 (0.048)
<i>News Pressure t-2</i>		-0.023 (0.035)	-0.023 (0.035)	-0.024 (0.035)	-0.024 (0.033)		0.013 (0.050)	0.013 (0.050)	0.011 (0.050)	0.011 (0.049)
<i>News Pressure t-3</i>		-0.035 (0.032)	-0.035 (0.032)	-0.037 (0.032)	-0.037 (0.034)		-0.038 (0.046)	-0.038 (0.046)	-0.037 (0.046)	-0.037 (0.047)
<i>Palestinian attacks (previous day)</i>				0.058** (0.025)	0.058** (0.026)				0.172*** (0.052)	0.172*** (0.055)
<i>Palestinian attacks (previous week)</i>				0.059** (0.023)	0.059*** (0.021)				0.152*** (0.052)	0.152*** (0.045)
<i>Palestinian attacks (week before previous)</i>				0.082*** (0.024)	0.082*** (0.022)				0.140*** (0.053)	0.140*** (0.045)
Observations	4,071	4,029	4,029	4,022	4,022	4,048	4,029	4,029	4,022	4,022
R-squared	0.172	0.175	0.175	0.184	—	0.175	0.140	0.140	0.161	—

Note: All regressions include year, calendar month, and day of the week fixed effects. Regression in columns (2)-(5) and (7)-(10) include seven lags and seven leads of news pressure. We exclude observations in the top and bottom 0.5 of the distribution of same-day news pressure in columns (1), (2), (6), and (7), and observations in the top and bottom 0.5 of the distribution of next-day news pressure in the remaining columns. Data on Israeli and Palestinian attacks are from B'Tselem. Standard errors clustered by month-year are reported in parentheses in columns (1)-(4) and (6)-(9); corrected Newey-West standard errors are reported in parentheses in columns (5) and (10). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

TABLE A.5: FREQUENCY OF ATTACKS DURING THE SECOND INTIFADA (2000-2004) AND AFTER IT (2005-2011)

	Intifada	Post-Intifada
Share days with Israeli attacks	59.7	25.4
Share days with Palestinian attacks	18.8	6.1
Share days with any attacks	65.6	28.8

Note: The table reports the share of days in which an attack was carried out by either Israeli forces or Palestinian combatants, separately for the Intifada period (September 29th 2000, beginning of our sample period to February 8th 2005) and the post-Intifada period (February 9th 2005 to November 24th of 2011, end of our sample period).

TABLE A.6: ISRAELI ATTACKS AND U.S. NEWS PRESSURE DURING THE SECOND INTIFADA (2000-2004) AND AFTER IT (2005-2011), FULL SAMPLE

Dependent variable:	Occurrence	Occurrence	Ln Casualties	Occurrence	Occurrence	Ln Casualties
Sample:	During Intifada			Post-Intifada		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>News Pressure (t+1)</i>	0.041 (0.060)	0.029 (0.062)	0.041 (0.092)	0.086** (0.043)	0.084** (0.042)	0.112** (0.055)
<i>Palestinian attacks (previous day)</i>		0.093*** (0.030)	0.215*** (0.056)		-0.011 (0.047)	0.066 (0.100)
<i>Palestinian attacks (previous week)</i>		0.073** (0.028)	0.152*** (0.046)		0.048* (0.029)	0.166** (0.068)
<i>Palestinian attacks (week before previous)</i>		0.071** (0.031)	0.143*** (0.051)		0.082*** (0.029)	0.138** (0.064)
News pressure same day	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
News pressure (lags)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
News pressure (leads)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,571	1,564	1,564	2,458	2,458	2,458
Probability of attack	59.7%	59.7%	59.7%	26.1%	26.1%	26.1%

Note: Day of the week fixed effects, calendar month fixed effects, year fixed effects, same day news pressure, as well as seven leads and seven lags of news pressure are included in all regressions. Corrected Newey-West standard errors reported in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

TABLE A.7: RESULTS FOR THE REMAINING SURVEY QUESTIONS

Questions about:	On-site report	Interview of correspondent	info: # of victims	Images of site of the attack	Footage of the aftermath	Photos of victims	Video of victims	Reaction of Palestinian authorities	Emotional scale	Tone of the story
	q9	q10	q13	q15	q16	q17	q18	q24	q25	q26
Panel A: Sample consists of stories about a particular Israeli attack that took place on the same day or the day before and that do not mention Palestinian attacks										
Dependent variable:										
<i>Next-day coverage</i>	0.0162 (0.107)	-0.0175 (0.0632)	-0.0701 (0.0977)	-0.0852 (0.122)	0.0452 (0.0907)	0.0433 (0.0304)	0.0454 (0.0730)	-0.0195 (0.0806)	0.203 (0.162)	0.115 (0.124)
Observations	201	201	201	201	201	201	201	201	201	201
R-squared	0.004	0.099	0.048	0.037	0.009	0.014	0.022	0.024	0.013	0.011
Mean same-day coverage	0.26	0.10	0.74	0.49	0.34	0.01	0.41	0.28	1.30	-0.08
Panel B: Full sample										
Dependent variable:	q9	q10	q13	q15	q16	q17	q18	q24	q25	q26
<i>Next-day coverage</i>	0.0204 (0.0911)	-0.0202 (0.0534)	-0.0509 (0.0852)	-0.0863 (0.108)	0.0523 (0.0763)	0.0287 (0.0272)	0.0564 (0.0733)	0.0516 (0.0780)	0.205 (0.130)	0.0361 (0.132)
Next-day coverage × Palestinian attack	-0.102 (0.0956)	0.0430 (0.0844)	0.0626 (0.0979)	-0.0469 (0.149)	-0.0326 (0.106)	-0.00405 (0.0408)	0.0399 (0.0966)	0.0716 (0.0947)	-0.318* (0.169)	0.0699 (0.172)
Story appears not on the same day and not the day after	-0.0729 (0.0620)	-0.0101 (0.0351)	-0.524*** (0.0547)	-0.420*** (0.0782)	-0.292*** (0.0617)	-0.0174 (0.0263)	-0.284*** (0.0587)	0.0704 (0.0570)	-0.00661 (0.117)	-0.0626 (0.0954)
Story about a particular attack	0.0885 (0.0642)	0.102** (0.0463)	0.0729* (0.0398)	0.0867 (0.0714)	-0.0158 (0.0684)	-0.0168 (0.0237)	0.0629 (0.0536)	0.185*** (0.0506)	0.389*** (0.119)	-0.0911 (0.0789)
Story about Palestinian attack	0.121** (0.0508)	0.0704** (0.0334)	0.211*** (0.0355)	0.110 (0.0813)	0.0598 (0.0498)	0.0169 (0.0129)	0.252*** (0.0463)	0.220*** (0.0630)	0.357*** (0.0938)	0.0763 (0.0636)
Observations	582	582	582	582	582	582	582	582	582	582
R-squared	0.039	0.129	0.349	0.177	0.068	0.015	0.182	0.075	0.126	0.015

Note: The table presents the regression results for all remaining measures of content that were not reported in Table 8. The specifications used are exactly the same. All dependent variables are dummies indicating a positive answer, with the exception of q25, which has a range of [-3;+3] and q26, with values ranging from 0 to 3. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The mean responses to the questions for sample of stories about a particular Israeli attack that took place on the same day or the day before and that do not mention Palestinian attacks are presented in the last row of Panel A. The mean responses to the questions for the entire population of videos is presented in Table A.3 in the online appendix.

FIGURE A.1: FRONT-PAGE PRESS COVERAGE OF UNPOPULAR GOVERNMENT ACTIONS AT THE TIME OF IMPORTANT SPORTS EVENTS

Example 1: Beijing Olympics and Russia-Georgia war




Example 2: FIFA World cup and Israeli attack on Gaza



Example 3: FIFA World cup and “Save the Thief” Decree




FIGURE A.2: THE DISTRIBUTION OF NEWS PRESSURE, THE U.S. TV NETWORKS



Note: The figure reports the distribution of news pressure on U.S. broadcast TV networks for the entire period of interest (2000-2011). The unit of measurement is 10 minutes. The blue line represents the corresponding Epanechnikov Kernel density estimate. The red lines represent the 10th, 50th and 90th percentiles of the distribution.

FIGURE A.3: NON-PARAMETRIC LOCAL LINEAR LEAST SQUARES BIVARIATE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE OCCURRENCE OR THE LOG NUMBER OF VICTIMS OF THE ISRAELI ATTACKS AND NEWS PRESSURE THE NEXT DAY

Full sample:



Zoom-in to the sub-sample of days with news pressure between its mean and the 95th percentile:





FIGURE A.4: FREQUENCY OF ISRAELI AND PALESTINIAN ATTACKS
DURING AND AFTER THE INTIFADA

Panel A: Israeli Attacks



Panel B: Palestinian Attacks

